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The intersecting challenges of climate change, human migration, and national and 
international instability present a unique challenge for U.S. foreign policy in the 
21st century. These three factors are already combining in ways that undermine 
traditional understandings of national security and offer ample reason to revisit 
divisions between diplomacy, defense, and development policy. 
This report is the second in a series of papers from the Center for American 
Progress that examines the implications of the climate change, migration, and 
security nexus. The series will highlight the overlays of these factors in key regions 
around the world and suggest ways in which U.S. policy must adapt to meet 
the challenges they present. This first regional report builds on the foundation 
provided by our framing paper, “Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict.” In this 
report we focus on the implications of these trends in Northwest Africa, already 
one of the most volatile regions in the world. Further papers will focus on India 
and Bangladesh, the Andean Region, and China. 
This series is closely linked to the Center for American Progress’s longstanding 
Sustainable Security project, which argues that our understanding of “security” 
must be broadened to meet the threats of the coming decades. Indeed, national 
security, human security, and collective security all have a part to play in achieving 
a safer and more equitable international environment. Our Climate, Migration, 
and Security project discusses and analyzes a series of regional key test cases for 
this comprehensive approach. 
We are especially grateful to the Heinrich Böll Foundation in Washington, D.C., 
and to the ZEIT-Stiftung Gerd und Ebelin Bucerius in Hamburg for their con-
tinuing support of our climate, migration, and security work at the Center for 
American Progress.
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Introduction and summary
Northwest Africa is crisscrossed with climate, migration, and security challenges. 
From Nigeria to Niger, Algeria, and Morocco, this region has long been marked 
by labor migration, bringing workers from sub-Saharan Africa north to the 
Mediterranean coastline and Europe. To make that land journey, migrants often 
cross through the Sahel and Sahel-Saharan region, an area facing increasing envi-
ronmental threats from the effects of climate change. The rising coastal sea level, 
desertification, drought, and the numerous other potential effects of climate change 
have the potential to increase the numbers of migrants and make these routes more 
hazardous in the future. Added to these challenges are ongoing security risks in the 
region, such as Nigeria’s struggles with homegrown insurgents and the growing 
reach of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which has expanded out of Algeria. 
For the United States and the international community, this region is criti-
cal because of its potential for future instability. The proximity of Algeria and 
Morocco to Europe, Nigeria’s emerging role as one of Africa’s most strategically 
important states, and Niger’s ongoing struggles with governance and poverty 
all demand attention. Northwest Africa’s porous borders and limited resources, 
which allow Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to flourish there, suggest that there 
is no time to waste in developing better and more effective policies for the region. 
The climate, migration, and security nexus is a key test case because it is likely to 
exacerbate all of these existing risk factors. Climate change alone poses a daunting 
challenge. No matter what steps the global community takes to mitigate carbon 
emissions, a warmer climate is inevitable. The effects are already being felt today 
and are projected to intensify as climate change worsens. All of the world’s regions 
and nations will experience some of the effects of this transformational challenge. 
Changing environmental conditions are likely to prompt human migration, 
adding another layer of complexity. In the 21st century the world could see 
substantial numbers of climate migrants—people displaced by the slow or sudden 
onset of climate change. While experts continue to debate the details of the 
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causal relationship between climate change and human migration, climate change 
is expected to aggravate many existing migratory pressures around the world. 
Extreme weather events such as droughts and floods are projected to increase the 
number of sudden humanitarian crises in areas least able to cope, such as those 
already mired in poverty or prone to conflict. 
Conflict and insecurity present the third layer of the nexus. This final layer is the 
most unpredictable, both within nations and transnationally, and will force the 
United States and the international community to confront climate and migration 
challenges within an increasingly unstructured security environment. The post-
Cold War decades have seen a diffusion of national security interests and threats. 
U.S. security is increasingly focused on addressing nonstate actors and nontradi-
tional sources of conflict and instability. The potential for the changing climate 
and associated migration to induce conflict or exacerbate existing instability is 
now recognized in national security circles.
This paper tracks how the overlays and intersections of climate change, migration, 
and security create an arc of tension in Northwest Africa comprising Nigeria, Niger, 
Algeria, and Morocco. These four nations, separated by the Sahara Desert, are 
rarely analyzed as a contiguous geopolitical region. Yet they are linked by exist-
ing international migration routes, which thread up from sub-Saharan Africa to 
the Mediterranean coast, moving people and cargo into Morocco, Algeria, Libya, 
and onward to Europe. Within the region, seasonal labor migration is widespread, 
particularly in areas vulnerable to rainfall fluctuations. 
We seek to examine what will happen when the effects of climate change interact 
with internal and transnational security challenges along these well-traveled routes, 
and connect those questions to the strategic interests of the United States, Europe, 
and the transatlantic community. (See map of the region on page 13.) 
Why we must engage in this arc of tension
Why should the U.S. and international policymakers be concerned about this 
nexus linking climate, migration, and security in Northwest Africa? Challenges 
related to the mitigation of carbon emissions as well as disaster risk management 
and economic and human security in the region alongside the need for a secure 
and stable global economy require strong partners and substantial capacities. 
Relatively minor investments can create significant progress toward improving 
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security and preparing the region for worsening climate conditions and increased 
migration. The costs of livelihood security, irrigation, improved migration 
monitors, and regional water cooperation pale alongside the likely future costs of 
humanitarian disaster, long-term security gaps, and conflict.
Further, among these particular countries, climate and migration patterns complicate 
a difficult political terrain. The United States and Europe are already involved in ongo-
ing counterterrorism activities to help stem the growth of Al Qaeda in the Maghreb 
(found in Algeria, Niger, Mali, Mauritania, and potentially in Nigeria and Morocco 
as well) and its possible linkage to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula through this 
corridor.1 The ongoing conflict in the oil-producing Niger Delta and the increasing 
violence of the insurgent Boko Haram movement in northern and central Nigeria, 
punctuated by the August 2011 suicide bombing of the 
U.N. building in Abuja, further underline the potential for 
instability, as does the Tuareg insurgency in northern Mali.
The United States and other countries have a vested interest 
in helping ensure that areas with weak or absent governance 
structures—where poverty, environmental degradation, and 
grievances over central governments and energy production 
coincide—do not become future recruiting grounds for 
extremists. The possible impacts of climate-related migration 
in such fragile situations could be destabilizing.
At the same time increased U.S. involvement in counterter-
rorism activities holds the potential for a serious backlash. 
Western involvement in its many forms could serve as a 
recruitment tool for those who see such efforts as a pretext 
for American military hegemony and establishing a forward 
presence in the region to secure future energy supplies and 
natural resources. Furthermore, geopolitical calculations of 
Western interest must acknowledge the added dimension of 
the uprisings in the Middle East and Maghreb. By focusing too narrowly on counter-
terrorism, U.S. policy risks being at odds with democratization movements. Maghreb 
states are also wary of how their cooperation with NATO on the Mediterranean Sea 
appears to domestic groups concerned with independence from the West.
This new pressure for transparency, both within the region’s governments and 
regarding U.S. policy, puts a premium on nontraditional approaches to security—
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Climate migration in northwest Africa
Nigeria, Niger, Algeria and Morocco bear the brunt      
of this growing security challenge
Source: Center for American Progress (2012).
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especially with regards to human security as defined by the United Nations to ensure 
the security of the individual as opposed to the state.2 This approach aims to mitigate 
threats to human conditions—including socioeconomic, political, food, health, 
environment, community, and personal safety—and maintain social stability.
Major U.S. imperatives in the region, including counterterrorism and reform, 
would be served by supporting, for example, Morocco’s efforts to peacefully settle 
the Western Sahara dispute or Nigeria’s efforts to quell ethno-religious violence. 
Establishing effective governance in Western Sahara and domestic stability in north-
ern Nigeria will allay economic uncertainty in the region and reassure other states 
confronting North-South and Christian-Muslim divides. Periodic attacks on oil 
pipelines and facilities in the Niger Delta have already affected world oil prices, while 
widespread bank robberies blamed on Boko Haram undermine Nigeria’s economic 
growth.3 Improving human security will lead to economic improvement.
Economic stability will in turn allow industrialized countries to cultivate greater 
investment in the region, which is sustaining 4 percent to 7 percent growth (with 
the exception of Niger at 2.5 percent), despite the lingering consequences of the 
Great Recession of 2007-2009. While U.S. foreign direct investment in these 
four countries remains predominantly in the oil and mining sectors, the region 
represents a significant future market for goods and services. Two-way trade 
between the United States and Nigeria totaled more than $34 billion in 2010, 
and American foreign direct investment reached $5.4 billion in 2009, making the 
United States the largest foreign investor in Nigeria.4 
Moreover, Nigeria is already a critical partner in advancing U.S. humanitarian 
goals. The nation’s involvement in six U.N. peace operations in Africa significantly 
reduces the burden on the United States in responding to regional crises. 
As these countries’ economies grow and diversify, they will be in a much stronger 
position to manage slow- and sudden-onset climate disasters, associated migra-
tion, and potential conflict. U.S. policy supporting these efforts in the region will 
have to balance the need for security and reform, such that these aspects are mutu-
ally reinforcing; too great a focus on either aspect will risk instability undermining 
reform or loss of credibility rendering security impossible. 
The arc of tension begins in Nigeria, Africa’s most populous state. Nigerians are 
already seeing early signs of climate change in a rising sea level, more frequent 
flooding, and outbreaks of disease in the southern megacity of Lagos, home to 
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more than 10 million people. In the northern part of the country, expanding 
desertification—which refers to the degradation of land productivity in dry land 
areas—has caused 200 villages to disappear.5 
These opposing pressures, driven by climate change, are expected to push internal 
migrants toward the center of Nigeria. At the same time a rapidly growing and 
increasingly urban population is seeking greater economic opportunities. The 
combination of these demographic trends and economic aspirations spur many 
Nigerians to move north. Existing international migration routes link people leaving 
Nigeria to Niger, where they cross into the Maghreb states and potentially Europe. 
Human mobility and climate change in Nigeria occur amid serious threats to 
national and local governance. The southern Niger Delta has supported an insur-
gency since the 1990s, driven in part by anger with corruption and the misman-
agement of the profits from the region’s booming oil industry. In the northern 
part of the country, religious tensions have turned violent, with more than 800 
people having been killed in the central Nigerian city of Jos since January 2011.6 
Boko Haram has undertaken attacks of increasing violence, including the U.N. 
bombing, and is behind a string of more than 100 armed bank robberies targeting 
lenders in north.7 A Christmas Day 2011 bombing outside Abuja killed more than 
40 Christian worshippers, provoking a brutal police crackdown.8 
•	 Africa’s most populous country with 170 million people will remain 
a crucial strategic partner in tackling trade, security, and environ-
mental concerns in Africa.
•	 Following independence from Britain in 1960 and the bloody 
Biafra civil war (1967–70), separatist movements continue to 
fester. Deep tensions have led to increasing violence in the north, 
particularly from extremist groups such as Boko Haram. In the 
south the armed struggle against the Movement for the Eman-
cipation of the Niger Delta continues, exacerbated periodically 
by political disputes, such as that surrounding the election of 
Goodluck Jonathan as president in 2009.
•	 Despite the nation’s status as the world’s eighth-largest oil pro-
ducer, Nigerians’ quality of life, per capita incomes, and average life 
expectancy at birth have not improved in line with increasing oil 
profits. Indeed, the apportionment of oil revenues and government 
benefits underpin much of the social unrest in Nigeria. 
•	 Past military coups, corruption, and natural resource grievances 
continue to hamper development.
•	 Lagos, Nigeria’s megacity, is at risk from sea-level rise by 2015; an 
estimated 18 million Nigerians live in Lagos State, according to the 
U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Nigeria
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Although the unrest in the Niger Delta and the violence in the north are geo-
graphically distinct, they both have their roots in underlying dissatisfaction with 
a government that has failed to sustain an inclusive, accountable, and transparent 
state. As the effects of climate change worsen, even more will be demanded of 
Nigeria’s limited governance capacity. 
Migrants from Nigeria and other sub-Saharan states who reach Niger, the second 
link in the arc of tension, enter one of Africa’s most desperate states. Niger has the 
world’s second highest fertility rate and a median age of only 15 years. Most of the 
booming population is dependent on rain-fed agriculture, but acreage of arable 
land has decreased dramatically over the past 50 years, and frequent droughts 
have impoverished and indebted many Nigeriens. In 2010 a severe drought left 
7.1 million Nigeriens without adequate food. Climate change is expected to make 
the country hotter and more prone to drought, erosion, and loss of forested land, 
exacerbating already difficult conditions.
people pass by dead bodies 
amid buring tires and debris 
in a street in onitsha, Nigeria, 
in 2006. 
the associateD press/GeorGe osoDi
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Niger also faces ongoing international and internal migration. Due to pressures 
from desertification and drought, some Nigerien pastoralists have shifted their 
migratory routes southwards into Nigeria in search of animal fodder and better 
grazing. In addition, unusual flooding in 2010 damaged many homes and farm-
land, creating an internal refugee situation and prompting other Nigeriens to seek 
shelter and employment in Nigeria, Libya, and the Ivory Coast. 
Agadez, the largest city in northern Niger, is a key waypoint for sub-Saharan 
migrants moving north, and a hotspot on the arc of tension. While estimates of 
the number transiting the country on this path are scarce, some research indicates 
that at least 65,000 Sub-Saharan migrants passed through Niger toward Algeria 
and Libya in 2003 alone.9 About half of these migrants are thought to come from 
the underdeveloped central and southern parts of Nigeria. 
Niger also faces a difficult security situation, including conflict over rangeland and 
water wells in the southeast and the north (especially near the Malian border), 
mineral-related conflict in the north, and the pervasive threat of Al Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb. In northern Agadez, home to the world’s second-largest uranium 
mine, a 2007 drought-driven rebellion by the Tuareg people led the government to 
dispatch 4,000 troops.10 
•	 Between gaining independence from France in 1960 and 1991, 
Niger had a one-party system. Multiparty elections established a 
democratic government in 1993, but institutions remained pro-
foundly weak. The two-term president Mamadou Tandja attempted 
to amend the constitution to prolong his presidency, resulting in a 
2010 military coup and a transitional military junta. Former Prime 
Minister Mahamadou Issoufou and his social-democratic party won 
the elections in 2011.
•	 Niger is deeply impoverished and consistently ranks near the 
bottom of the United Nations Development Programme’s Human 
Development Index. 
•	 Longstanding grievances between the Nigerien government and 
Tuareg rebels in the northern region, related to the underdevelop-
ment of the vast and insecure space along the border of the Sahara, 
pose serious security risks.
•	 With a population of about 16 million people, Niger’s per capita 
income is just $700. The country is heavily reliant upon rain-fed ag-
riculture, which accounted for 39 percent of gross domestic product 
and 90 percent of the labor force in 2009.
•	 Niger experiences devastating droughts. The 2005 drought—coupled 
with a locust infestation—led to food shortages for as many as 2.5 
million Nigeriens. Food security continues to put the country at risk.
Niger
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Additionally, Niger is within the range of operations of Al Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb, which is known to engage in kidnapping and drug trafficking in the 
broader region. Agricultural and pastoral livelihoods have been made more dif-
ficult by the effects of climate change; this has translated to increasing numbers of 
disenfranchised youth, who security experts believe are more easily recruited to 
assist Al Qaeda in return for money and food. 
Furthermore, some of the effects of climate change, such as desertification and flood-
ing, are thought to benefit Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb by depopulating rural 
areas in which the group can then operate more freely. The Nigerien government has 
reorganized its security services in the hope of encouraging Nigerians not to engage 
in violent acts; however, the government has been accused of being incompetent or 
even unwilling to take action even when information about Al Qaeda is received.11
Algeria is the third link in the arc of tension. Like much of the Maghreb region, 
Algeria faces a future made increasingly difficult by the effects of climate change, 
including increasing temperatures, decreasing rainfall, and a rising sea level. Water 
is of particular concern—the country already ranks second among African states 
in terms of water scarcity—as is desertification. 
Additionally, climate variability in sub-Saharan Africa has the potential to indi-
rectly affect Algeria by contributing to migration along the arc of tension and 
•	 Algeria gained independence from France in 1962, after eight years 
of fighting. 
•	 Since 1982 Algerian Islamists and the government have had a 
highly adversarial relationship marked by repeated states of 
emergency and the forcible suppression of demonstrations. 
Algeria’s first serious opposition party, the Islamic Salvation Front, 
posed a major threat to the governing party and the military. 
The Front was outlawed, sparking a decade of violence which 
resulted in 200,000 deaths and an estimated 1 million internally 
displaced persons.24
•	 During the 1990s and early 2000s, other groups, notably the Armed 
Islamic Group and the Islamic Salvation Army, joined the Islamic 
Salvation Front’s antigovernment struggle, engaging in political 
assassinations, targeted killing of foreigners, riots, and attacks on 
civilians.25 
•	 Financed through ransoms, drug sales, and arms smuggling, Al Qa-
eda’s North Africa wing, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, has claimed 
responsibility for a range of violent acts in North Africa, including 
the 2007 bombing of the U.N. headquarters in Algiers and repeated 
kidnappings of foreigners in Algeria and neighboring countries.
Algeria
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other migratory paths. The southern spread of the Sahara Desert is already 
thought to contribute to seasonal migration from sub-Saharan Africa toward 
Algeria and the Maghreb. 
Algeria experienced a decade of internal violence in the 1990s. This conflict gave 
rise to the terrorist organization that eventually became Al Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb. Although violence has declined significantly since the early 2000s, 
Algeria has still experienced close to 1,000 incidents of political violence since 
the September 11, 2001 Al Qaeda attacks on New York City and Washington, 
including kidnappings and high-profile bombings.12 Large ungoverned spaces 
and poor border controls allow migrants to move north from Niger, but also 
create space in which groups such as Al Qaeda can operate. Tamanrasset, a major 
way station for migrants in southern Algeria, is the new home of a joint military 
command center between Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger, which is meant to 
confront the threat from Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. 
The arc of tension ends in Morocco, historically one of Africa’s most stable 
states. Like Algeria, water shortage due to climate change is a serious concern in 
Morocco. Rainfall is projected to decrease by roughly 20 percent by the end of the 
century, according to a range of projections.13 The country faces a rising sea level 
along the coast, including in agricultural areas in the north, which may lead to 
increasing salinity in freshwater aquifers. With 44 percent of the country’s work-
•	 Gained independence from France in 1956. Spain maintains the en-
claves of Ceuta and Melilla (unrecognized by Morocco) in the north, 
attracting illegal migrants attempting to enter the European Union. 
•	 In 1999 King Mohammed VI came to power, immediately free-
ing some 8,000 political prisoners and reducing the sentences of 
another 30,000. 
•	 The 2002 and 2007 parliamentary elections were regarded as the 
first free and fair elections in the country’s history.
•	 Despite strong economic growth, poverty remains a serious chal-
lenge, exceeding 25 percent in rural areas. Like Algeria, Morocco 
also struggles with high unemployment, particularly among young 
urban dwellers. 
•	 The country has confronted several domestic Islamic terrorist 
organizations, such as the (largely defeated) Moroccan Islamic 
Combatant Group, involved in the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 
2004, Salafiya Jihadiya, and Al Qaeda cells allegedly connected to 
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Regional cooperation has been 
limited by poor relations between Morocco and Algeria.
Morocco
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force engaged in agriculture, this development poses a fundamental challenge 
to the current Moroccan economy. Ultimately, the shifting climate may result in 
internal migration, forcing rural populations to move in search of more fertile land 
and eroding the geographic separation of ethnic groups. 
Morocco is also under pressure from existing flows of international migrants, 
many of whom enter the country in an attempt to continue on to Europe. Two 
Spanish enclaves on the Mediterranean coast, Ceuta and Melilla, are key des-
tinations for Africans seeking to enter the European Union. In 2005 efforts by 
hundreds of migrants to break through the fences surrounding the enclaves led to 
several deaths and resulted in the erection of more sophisticated border fences. 
While the impetus for migration into Morocco is difficult to determine with preci-
sion, researchers focused on the country point to decreasing rain and lower crop 
yields in sub-Saharan Africa as a factor in the decision to migrate.
The same enclaves that have attracted migrants seeking a chance to enter Europe 
have also drawn the attention of Al Qaeda. In 2006 Ayman al-Zawahiri, then Al 
Qaeda’s second in command, called for the liberation of Ceuta and Melilla. Thus 
far the terrorist network has reportedly not been successful in carrying out an 
attack in Morocco. An April 2011 café bombing, however, bore the hallmarks 
of an Al Qaeda operation.14 In January 2011 the Moroccan government arrested 
27 alleged Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb members along the border with the 
Western Sahara.15 
What policymakers can do about this arc of tension
The overlapping challenges of climate change, migration, and security in these 
four nations pose a critical and complex problem for policymakers. While it is dif-
ficult to draw a direct line of causality from specific climate change hazards to the 
decision to migrate or to a particular conflict, the interrelationships between these 
factors mean that viewing and addressing them in isolation is no longer sufficient. 
Indeed, this particular nexus demands policy solutions that cut across levels of 
governance and drive the U.S. government to synthesize traditionally distinct 
fields such as defense, diplomacy, and development. These new, complex chal-
lenges will force the United States and the international community to finally 
break from a Cold War-era understanding of security and move toward a more 
individual-based concept of human security.
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At a policy level, the Obama administration’s first National Security Strategy 
document in 2010 prioritized conflict prevention, peacekeeping, counterterror-
ism, access to markets, and the protection of “carbon sinks” (places in nature that 
absorb carbon out of the atmosphere) in Africa, while the 2011 National Military 
Strategy emphasized security partnerships in the Trans-Sahel region.16 These cur-
rent efforts are limited and not yet institutionalized, and still do not fully incorpo-
rate the environmental realities underlying the challenges to the region. 
Overall, U.S. foreign assistance to the region is approximately $668 million. 
Nigeria receives $614 million, primarily for health and police training; Algeria 
$2.5 million, for counterterrorism and military training; Niger $17 million, mostly 
for food aid; and Morocco $35 million, for military and development assistance.17 
Internationally, the International Monetary Fund currently has no loans to the 
four countries. Algeria has accepted equity investments and loans totaling $82 
spanish soldiers patrol the 
border between morocco and 
spain’s enclave of melilla, in 
north africa, saturday, oct. 
8, 2005. human rights group 
amnesty international said 
it was illegal to expel african 
immigrants from the spanish 
enclaves of ceuta and melilla 
to morocco. 
the associateD press/alvaro BarrieNtos
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million from the International Finance Corporation, the equity investment arm of 
the World Bank, but no loans from the World Bank itself.18 Nigeria has $4 billion 
in outstanding loans to the World Bank, including its cheapest lending arm, the 
International Development Association, with 2011 loans close to half a billion 
dollars aimed at stoking economic growth and employment in non-oil sectors.19 
The World Bank maintains a total commitment of $1.5 billion in Morocco and 
plans to disburse $200 million more in 2012 in investment lending.20 In addition, 
the bank has disbursed nearly $1.6 billion to Niger, including $70 million in 2010 
and $41 million in 2011.21 And the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency is currently mobilizing $1 billion in insurance capacity for the Middle East 
and North Africa, including Morocco, to ensure that foreign direct investment in the 
region does not suffer because of the nearby Arab Spring revolutions.22
Lastly, the U.S. military’s counterterrorism commitment to the region was bolstered 
by the creation of African Command, or AFRICOM, in 2008, tasked with devel-
oping the region’s professional military capabilities.23 In 2006 the United States 
allocated $500 million for the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership to train 
and equip African armed forces, including the four states in this report.
These are the traditional instruments of development and security, but the conver-
sation about national security and military strategy in the United States is chang-
ing. With the U.S. government facing at least several years of austerity budgets, 
defense and foreign affairs spending will not escape the cuts unscathed. If prop-
erly executed, budget cuts could pare down unnecessary spending in the United 
States’ massive defense budget (now larger than at the height of President Ronald 
Reagan’s Cold War buildup), while protecting the core defense, diplomacy, and 
development capabilities needed to confront complex crises. 
If mishandled, though, the cuts could have a dramatic impact on nonmilitary inter-
national affairs funding. Rebalancing and reorienting these capabilities will help the 
United States create more effective and efficient programs in countries like Nigeria, 
Niger, Algeria, and Morocco. The United States cannot hope to encourage stable, 
fair, and effective governance if we continue to understaff and underfund our civil-
ian aid and foreign-affairs capabilities. Thus, a thorough review of the relationship 
between defense, diplomacy, and development is required. The division of labor 
between these three branches of our foreign and security policy establishment must 
be adapted to a new and rapidly changing post-Cold War environment. 
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This report examines the arc of tension to understand how prepared we are to 
achieve this new balance. Through analysis of the climate, migration, and security 
factors outlined above, it lays out a series of recommendations to reorient U.S. 
and international policy. These recommendations are also intended to inform the 
transatlantic and multilateral conversation on the climate, migration, and security 
nexus. Briefly, we recommend a new approach.
Niger and Nigeria are rarely discussed in conjunction with Algeria and Morocco. 
The first two countries are usually considered separately, as part of Sub-Saharan 
Africa and the Maghreb, respectively. The United States pursues very different 
forms of engagement, development assistance, and diplomacy with each of these 
countries, despite existing migratory flows that link all four nations. We argue that 
this practice is outdated. 
Secondly, the nexus of climate change, migration, and conflict produces pressure 
points that need comprehensive regional approaches. From a regional perspective, 
and based upon four case studies, we highlight priority issues facing the United 
States, the international community, and regional policy actors in addressing this 
unprecedented challenge and provide recommendations to shape the future of 
U.S. and international foreign assistance. 
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Northwest Africa will face a set of climate challenges that will reach across geo-
graphically and politically disconnected states, and force governments to plan for 
widely disparate effects within single countries. In particular, the availability of 
freshwater—too much, or too little—will become an increasingly urgent issue. 
Morocco and Algeria are both projected to face freshwater scarcity by 2025.26 
Despite predictions that areas of Southern Algeria will see increased water avail-
ability, the Northern region, home to the majority of the country’s population is, 
may see a 10 percent to 20 percent reduction in available water.27
Climate change, along with human activity, will also affect the availability of ara-
ble land in Northwest Africa. Desertification, defined by the U.N. International 
Fund for Agricultural Development as “the persistent degradation of dry land 
ecosystems by human activities and climatic variations,” is slowly squeezing 
livelihoods dependent upon natural resources, and thus the capacity of citizens 
in the region to support themselves.28 
Nigeria, for example, is already losing about 3,500 square kilometers (1,350 
square miles) of land to desertification each year, which may be exacerbated by cli-
mate change in some situations.29 Nigeria and its northern neighbor, Niger, both 
have sizable agricultural sectors. As of 2006, 90 percent of Niger’s population was 
employed in the agricultural sector,30 and it’s estimated that up to 70 percent of 
Nigerians work in the same sector.31 As of 2009, agriculture sustained 40 percent 
of Nigeria’s gross domestic product.32 Further stress on this critical sector of the 
economy would have serious consequences for the country and its citizens. The 
fact that agriculture is simultaneously impacted by and a driver of desertification 
further complicates the picture.
Coastal regions of Northwest Africa may find their populations at risk from a 
rising sea level and tropical storms. Half of the population of Lagos, home to 15 
million people, lives only six feet above sea level. 33 In 2009 the Center for Global 
Development reported that climate change is likely to increase the intensity of 
The arc of tension
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cyclone storm surges, with potentially devastating effects for coastal populations 
in Northwest Africa and elsewhere. While the precise effects of this phenomenon 
are unknown, the center found that all of Nigeria’s coastal agricultural land is at 
risk from the effects of intensified storm surges.34 
Moreover, the Nigerian Environmental Study Action Team identified “possible sub-
mergence of oil wells and related infrastructure” as one of the country’s vulnerabili-
ties to climate change.35 In places, especially Forcados in the Delta region, some oil 
wells have already been lost to the ocean due to erosion.36 The Niger Delta currently 
accounts for slightly more than 8 percent of U.S. crude oil imports,37 and several of 
the oil constructions are close enough to the shoreline to be affected by sea level 
rises.38 The worst effects of climate change could damage aspects of the oil industry, 
resulting in loss of income for Nigeria, energy security concerns in the United States 
and Europe, and environmental damage in the region.
About three-quarters of arable rain-fed land in the Sahel will be greatly affected by 
climate change, dramatically altering the region’s physical and political landscapes 
in the near future.39 Nigeria and Niger share a porous frontier of more than 900 
miles, with border communities that have maintained close relations for hundreds 
of years. While seasonal migration has always played a huge role in the lives of the 
people in this region, population growth and drought are harming the profitability 
of seasonal migration; increasing numbers of migrants have made work more diffi-
cult to find. Niger’s population is projected to more than quadruple, and Nigeria’s 
population to double or triple by 2035.40 If these countries grow as forecasted, one 
consequence may be ongoing and prolonged food crises. Indeed, it is the threat of 
food insecurity that has caused Africans to “already see climate change and secu-
rity though the same lens.”41
Growing global demand for fossil fuels and alternatives such as uranium further 
enhances the potential for conflict in economies that depend upon extractive 
industries for government revenue. This adds a geopolitical dimension to regional 
or local conflict. Nigeria’s oil sector provides 95 percent of its export earnings and 
about 80 percent of its fiscal budget, despite the fact that 70 percent of Nigerians 
are dependent upon the agricultural sector for their personal livelihood.42 
Niger, meanwhile, is a landlocked economy dependent upon huge uranium 
deposits—which accounted for 64 percent of national exports in 2009—as well 
as oil, gold, coal, and other mineral resources.43 The extreme poverty—with 
per capita income of about $800—and lack of employment offer recruitment 
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opportunities for criminal groups already involved in extortion, corruption, 
armed rebellion, and terrorist activities.44 Unemployed migrants and young 
people are more vulnerable to these illegal groups. 
Linking the environmentally, religiously, and ethnically diverse regions of West 
Africa, the Maghreb, and sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria and Niger function as connec-
tor states for transit migrants en route from Africa to Europe. Nigeria and Niger are 
also the unintended destinations for migrants who fail to complete their journey; the 
majority of migrants expelled from Libya and Algeria, for example, end up in Niger.45 
In March 2011 the Red Cross announced it would set up emergency shelters for 
several hundred people in the city of Agadez that was exposed to major floods and 
also is a traditional stop for migrants whose numbers have grown in the wake of the 
Libyan conflict. The International Organization for Migration estimated in April 
2011 that 30,000 refugees from Libya had sought safety in Niger.46
a Fulani nomad woman 
collects drinking water for 
her family’s donkeys, sheep, 
and cattle, in Gadabeji, Niger 
in 2010. at this time of year, 
the Gadabeji reserve should 
be a refuge for the nomadic 
tribes who travel across the 
moonscape deserts of Niger to 
graze their cattle. But the grass 
is meager, not enough even for 
the small goats, after a drought 
killed off the last year’s crops. 
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The Sahel corridor also serves as a transshipment point for cocaine transported 
to Africa from Brazil, Peru, and Colombia destined for the European market, 
making these connector states even more susceptible to illicit economies. Nigeria 
and Niger therefore face a daunting combination of security risks ranging from 
desertification, population growth, and migration pressures to weather-induced 
disasters and the influx of drug smugglers and political extremists—trends that 
could converge with increasingly destructive results as the effects of climate 
change accelerate and worsen. 
To the north, Algeria and Morocco present unique challenges of their own. The 
Maghreb states of North Africa are often grouped with Middle Eastern coun-
tries as a contiguous geopolitical region, yet the northward flow of sub-Saharan 
migrants also connects these states to the rest of Africa, and thus to the effects of 
climate change and conflict on sub-Saharan migrant-sending states. Algeria and 
Morocco will face climate challenges of their own, most critically water scarcity, 
alongside serious internal security threats from Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
and more localized extremist groups. 
Ultimately, the combination of climate change, migration, and security will 
pressure these states from all sides. The northward movement of migrants into 
the Maghreb, whether driven by conflict, climate, or other factors, will provoke 
increasing pressure from the European Union to control illegal border crossings 
into the continent. At the same time, Algeria and Morocco will confront internal 
pressure for reform in the face of the Arab Spring uprisings to their east. Whether 
and how they manage these competing tensions will have important ramifications 
for regional stability and thus for U.S. security interests more broadly. 
Desertification, water fluctuations, a rising sea level, storm surges, and other 
effects of climate change, combined with Northwest Africa’s already harsh climate, 
will put severe strain on a region that possesses limited resources and capacity to 
deal with the consequences of climate change. As a result the ranks of the region’s 
already numerous migrants will grow in numbers. When, where, and how these 
people migrate will have consequences for the region’s environment, economy, 
stability, and security.
We will now look at each of these countries in more detail to outline the unique 
yet often common problems they face due to climate migration, conflict, and 
security in the 21st century.
Nigeria  | www.americanprogress.org 19
Climate change is expected to affect Nigeria with desertification and flooding, 
resulting in migration from the north and south. These moves will put enormous 
pressure on Nigeria’s middle-belt in the Guinea Savannah. Nigerians are already 
seeing the impacts of a rising sea level, more frequent storms, flooding, and result-
ing outbreaks of disease in the megacity of Lagos, as well as drought and food 
insecurity in the northern region of the country. 
Conflict, violence, and kidnapping have long plagued the Niger Delta because of 
the country’s heavy reliance on the oil sector for revenues that do little to improve 
the lives of local residents. Growing desertification in the north has led to height-
ened tensions between and within pastoral and agricultural communities, demon-
strating how the competition for natural resources can become intermingled with 
ethnic and religious conflict. 
Nigeria is the fifth-largest supplier of U.S. crude oil,47 but corruption and mis-
management have in the past swallowed as much 40 percent of Nigeria’s $20 
billion annual oil income, according to former Nigeria anticorruption chief 
Nuhu Ribadu.48 Rampant corruption in the petroleum industry continues to 
be a major problem, threatening economic growth and stoking discontent.49 
Nigerian officials recently opened an investigation into a more than $4 billion 
annual discrepancy between the amount of subsidized petrol purchased and the 
amount consumed by Nigerians.50 
This loss of key revenue and economic support is a partial cause of the insur-
gency in the Niger Delta. Since the 1990s local groups have fought back against 
multinational oil companies that they believed were exploiting them, sabotaging 
equipment, and kidnapping or murdering personnel. The Niger Delta insurgents 
also decry the compliance and neglect of the federal government, which has not 
delivered any democratic dividend since Nigeria’s return to civilian rule in 1999. 
This situation is made even more perilous given the Niger Delta population’s 
dependence on the environment; fishing and agriculture are the two traditional 
Nigeria
•	 Rapid population growth and 
a population with an average 
age of 19 are placing enor-
mous demographic pressures 
on the economy and the 
environment. 
•	 Rapid desertification has 
already caused 200 northern 
villages to disappear.
•	 Climate change appears to 
be accelerating Nigerian 
urbanization with potentially 
dangerous results.
•	 Weak governance, corruption, 
and a long history of ethnic 
tensions undermine Nigeria’s 
ability to deal with additional 
shocks from climate change.
Nigeria: Fast facts
20 center for american progress | climate change, migration, and conflict in Northwest africa
occupations in the Delta. The 
United Nations estimates 
that agriculture, forestry, and 
fishing still account for more 
than 40 percent of the region’s 
employment, despite the 
decline of these traditional 
livelihoods with the ascen-
dancy of the oil industry.51 
Alongside the Delta conflict, 
unrest and religious tension in 
the north is requiring increasing 
government resources. A five-
day uprising in 2010 resulted 
in the deaths of more than 700 
people in Borno State, and more 
than 800 people have been 
killed in 2011 in Jos, a major 
city in central Nigeria, as reli-
gious tensions peaked over land 
disputes. Most recently, Boko 
Haram—a militant Islamist 
group decrying “Western” ideas 
and the marginalization of 
northern Nigerians—has drasti-
cally escalated the violence. 
Besides the bombing of U.N. 
headquarters in Abuja and the 
bloody Christmas Day 2011 
attacks already mentioned, 
the group was responsible for 
attacks in the northern city of Kano, which killed roughly 150 people.52 
Even though all of this unrest takes place at opposite ends of the country and 
for ostensibly different reasons, it is ultimately tied to the federal government’s 
inability to be genuinely inclusive, accountable, and transparent. These issues 
will have serious repercussions as climate change continues to impact the condi-
tions of traditional livelihoods.
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Nigeria’s security challenges
Nigeria faces Islamist militancy in the north-east, where Boko Haram is active. In the central northern 
regions, ethno-religious clashes and some kidnapping occur along the border between the mainly Muslim 
north and Christian and animist south. The Niger Delta has long faced oil-theft, kidnapping, and piracy.
Source: BBC News at bbc.co.uk/news
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Demographic developments are exacerbating environmental degradation and 
conflict in Nigeria. The country is home to more than 15 percent of the entire 
African population and the median age is just 19 years. Nigeria’s total population 
is projected to double to roughly 320 million by 2040.53 Alone, the Niger Delta 
population is set to total more than 45 million people by 2020.54 
In addition, climate change is already affecting Nigeria in significant ways. As 
mentioned, roughly 1,350 square miles of Nigerian land turns to desert each year, 
driving farmers and herders south from the Sahel and into cities.55 Agriculture 
comprises up to 40 percent of Nigeria’s gross domestic product—the largest mea-
sure of economic growth—and 75 percent of employment, and has shrunk since 
the petroleum industry boom in the 1980s. Making matters worse, as noted above, 
the U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has identified Lagos, one of 
West Africa’s megacities, to be at risk from sea-level rise by 2015.
a damaged car at the site 
of the police headquarters 
bombed by a suicide bomber 
in Kano, Nigeria on Jan. 22, 
2012. more than 150 people 
were killed in a series of 
coordinated attacks by a 
radical islamist sect in north 
Nigeria’s largest city, according 
to an internal red cross 
document seen sunday by an 
associated press reporter.
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Lake Chad, which marks Nigeria’s northeast border, has been reduced to one-
twentieth its size during the 1960s due to a drier climate and changing water 
managements. Dr. Seidu Mohammed, director general of Nigeria’s National Space 
Research and Development Agency, has said this has harmed about 25 million 
people by disrupting livelihoods such as farming and fishing.56 
Changing weather patterns have additional destabilizing effects; “We had rainy 
and dry season before, now it’s all mixed up,” says Yinka Adeyemi, an advisor for 
the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa. Human mobility is a consequence of 
climate change that has created other problems. Adeyemi explains, “The scarcity 
and shortage of water in the area creates competition between man and cattle. It’s 
like Darfur in certain areas of Nigeria.”57 
A recent survey indicates 200 villages in northern Nigeria have disappeared due 
to desertification.58 Desertification is also considered the cause of food shortages 
that have forced Fulani herdsmen worried about unreliable weather and disease 
to migrate southwest in search of cattle grazing areas, where they are joined by 
migrants from Niger also seeking better living conditions. Victor Fodeke, head of 
the Climate Change Unit of Nigeria’s government, describes the problem: 
[I came] face to face with this issue in 2009, in [the] Katsina and Borno 
States—frontline states. The Governor was trying to deal with nomadic tribes 
looking for water and grazing, who were moving from climate impacted areas 
with lost arable land and water and overrunning the local populations, coming 
from Niger and Chad.59 
The arrival of migrants was also considered a trigger for the recent ethno-religious 
violence in Jos and Kaduna, as well as a series of armed conflicts between pastoral-
ists and farming Hausa communities, the former claiming economic exclusion and 
manipulation, the latter claiming theft and Jihadism. 60 
The April 2011 presidential election was, in many ways, the most free and fair 
election Nigeria has seen to date, but it was also the most violent. Even though 
there are high hopes for the newly established judicial commission and upcoming 
reconciliation conference, the election outcome has divided the country in a way 
that can only contribute to instability. 
Former Vice President Goodluck Jonathan decisively defeated Muhammadu Buhari, 
a major general in the Nigerian army from the more religious and traditional north-
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ern regions. Jonathan’s victory sparked controversy, with political opponents arguing 
that a representative from the predominantly Muslim north deserved the office 
after years of rule from the south. Accusations of electoral fraud in the aftermath of 
the poll led to violence in northern Nigeria, as people protested a result they feared 
would lead to continued marginalization for the north. 
While the scaled up attacks of Boko Haram have been cast by many media 
sources as part of the narrative of global jihad, approaching the problem from 
this angle ignores the local roots of the discontent. Boko Haram plays on resent-
ment among the predominantly Muslim Hausa-Fulani, who feel marginalized 
and ignored by the central government. Ethnic tensions between the predomi-
nantly Christian Yoruba and the Hausa-Fulani also feed the violence, exacer-
bated by migration—partly driven by more difficult environmental conditions 
in the north—of Hausa-Fulani into traditionally Yoruba lands.61 Once again, it is 
a young boy takes water 
from lake chad to drink, in 
Koudouboul, chad, in 2006. 
the lake that once provided 
adequate livelihoods for 20 
million people in west-central 
africa, from chad, Nigeria, 
cameroon and Niger, has lost 
90 per cent of its surface area 
in 30 years.
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easy to see how the increasing 
pressures of climate change 
could contribute to these 
incidents of social unrest and 
violence.
Yet the insecurity caused 
by climate-driven mobility 
migration is not limited to 
outright violence or militarism. 
Flooding throughout 2010 
in the Niger Delta and in 
northwestern Nigeria also 
presented a serious challenge, 
testing the government’s ability 
to organize temporary shelters 
and relocate local populations. 
Delta communities are highly 
vulnerable and climate-related 
disasters can undermine the 
most basic human security. 
The 2010 flood refugees faced 
personal security issues such 
as theft, undernourishment, 
and malaria, and often return 
to low-lying, high-risk areas. 
Rachel Okegbola, director 
of the Gender Training and 
Development Network in 
Nigeria, describes the problem: 
The issue becomes a shelter 
problem [and] we call them 
refugee camps. The govern-
ment has been moving people 
from location to location. Women … have to move with children and [their] 
whole house; they go without food and [are] undernourished. These are the secu-
rity issues arising from migration … the government can’t handle it alone.62 
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Nigeria’s ethnic composition
Nigeria’s 170 million people are divided between numerous ethno-linguistic groups and also along 
religious lines. Broadly, the Hausa-Fulani people based in the north are mostly Muslims. The Yorubas of the 
south-west are divided between Muslims and Christians, while the Igbos of the south-east and neighbor-
ing groups are mostly Christian or animist. The Middle Belt is home to hundreds of groups with different 
beliefs, and around Jos there are frequent clashes between Hausa-speaking Muslims and Christian mem-
bers of the Berom community. 
Source: BBC News at bbc.co.uk/news
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Responding to these challenges
How are responses to such multidimensional challenges currently being conceptu-
alized? While there is consensus on the need to address livelihood creation as part 
of managing migration or adapting to climate change, approaches to livelihood 
creation vary in the context of the intersection of migration and climate change. 
The views of experts in the region fall into roughly four categories: 
•	 The lack of visible investments in infrastructure
•	 Poor disaster preparedness and management skills
•	 The need for flexible financial mechanisms to cope with climate change
•	 The need to create ecosystem and conservation services
Let’s look at each of them briefly in turn.
The lack of visible investments in infrastructure
Outside of the oil industry, Nigeria lacks meaningful investment in important 
infrastructure needs. For many marginalized areas there is little hope for new 
economic opportunities and few sources for reliable information about the chal-
lenges they face or potential adaptive responses. Investment in transportation and 
information infrastructure helps marginalized people adapt to micro changes on 
many levels. Such investments can provide economic opportunity, improve coor-
dination and delivery of essential services, raise awareness of future challenges, 
and improve responses to crises. 
In Nigeria many people facing insecurity from the challenges outlined migrate 
with little knowledge of what lies ahead, and the suburbs of Lagos and other cities 
become a “staging ground” for herders migrating toward urban centers in search of 
work.63 This is one example of how investments in infrastructure could address the 
nexus of climate change, migration, and security.
Poor disaster preparedness and management skills
Given the lack of disaster preparedness, community-created emergency struc-
tures, including procedures and training for flood survival must be built. If these 
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structures could be institutionalized and expanded to include stabilization or live-
lihood programs, there would be a systematic and structured means of redeploy-
ing labor after disasters.
The need for flexible financial mechanisms to cope with climate change
Another strategic approach looks at flexible financial mechanisms to manage climate 
change adaptation. The most obvious option is to provide agricultural subsidies 
to farmers and herders during floods and drought. Other proposals include imple-
menting exchange rate controls during famine and efficiency gains in workers’ remit-
tances from abroad. These measures could create a highly enabling macroeconomic 
environment in which climate change adaptation is the responsibility of individuals. 
The challenge will be to secure equal wealth distribution to each Nigerian state and 
target support for those most likely to be affected by climate change.
The need to create ecosystem and conservation services
An emphasis on lower-cost government or foreign aid interventions that enable 
people to stay where they are without creating new jobs is a perspective known as 
ecosystem and conservation services—providing livelihoods that can make com-
munities more economically resilient to climate change. These techniques include 
reducing deforestation (85 percent of it goes to firewood) through the distribu-
tion of cook stoves, dry-season farming, drip irrigation, and efficient rainwater use, 
all of which reduce human impact on the local ecosystem. 
A “living with floods” focus on watershed erosion control and coastal mangrove 
protection also reduces vulnerability to extreme weather events. But it’s important 
to bear in mind that engineered solutions to adaptation (dams being a primary 
example) can unintentionally work against natural solutions.64 
Incorporating these ideas in Nigeria
The Nigerian government will likely incorporate some of the ideas outlined above 
in its current efforts to formulate plans for adaptation and disaster response. But 
it is unlikely a migration-oriented response will be included, because most people 
wish to return to disaster-affected areas, making it difficult for the government to 
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pursue the issue of permanent resettlement. There are also significant concerns 
about the government’s ability and willingness to implement its plans in a mean-
ingful way. While Nigerians have little faith in their government to do anything for 
them—at local, regional, or federal levels—the 2011 presidential election pres-
ents an important opportunity to shift how the regime is viewed since it created a 
solid majority for President Goodluck Jonathan.
In the meantime the government is moving toward creation of a new Climate 
Change Commission apart from the Environment Ministry. “Climate change 
will happen, [and] we have to prepare for adaptation,” warns U.N. advisor Yinka 
Adeyemi, adding, “We are losing the ice, water levels will rise, [and] people will 
be displaced. Africa needs to adapt.”65 Given the responsibilities of developed 
countries for causing climate change, Nigerian adaptation, like most adaptation 
efforts globally, has thus far depended upon foreign assistance. This arrange-
ment is particularly vulnerable to corruption, presenting a tremendous obstacle 
in a county like Nigeria. 
That equation, however, has the potential to change. Almost half of global economic 
growth in 2010 occurred within Africa’s domestic economies. Nigeria averaged 
annual growth of 7.4 percent between 2003 and 2009. Meanwhile, the country’s 
current reform agenda includes banking-sector reform and a system to set aside oil 
revenues for debt relief.66 With unprecedented growth in its agriculture, small-scale 
construction, distribution, and retail trade sectors, Nigeria is experiencing steady 
economic expansion.67 Combined with a sense of urgency on climate issues and an 
unwillingness to wait for donors (given the realities of climate change’s impacts in 
Nigeria) this might result in early action on climate change. 
Nigeria seeks to lead a West African Climate Exchange, for example, though 
it is unclear how such domestically initiated and market-based initiatives will 
develop relative to foreign assistance. Nigeria’s ambition for regional leader-
ship has been hampered in the past by its lack of governance, frequent internal 
conflicts, and rampant corruption.
Climate change, human mobility, and local conflicts create pressure that threatens 
the cohesion of Africa’s most populous nation. It is important that the U.S. foreign 
policy community continue paying attention to this strategically important 
country. As this bilateral relationship develops, Nigeria could become a test case 
for addressing complex situations that will increasingly define the way the United 
States conceptualizes, funds, and runs its foreign policy in the decades to come. 
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Environmental degradation, human mobility, and climate change are factors 
in multifaceted threat scenarios that challenge the current institutional setup 
of U.S. aid, diplomatic, and security policies. Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs Johnnie Carson stated, “Nigeria is without a doubt for the 
United States and probably for Africa the most important country on the 
sub-Saharan portion of the continent.”68 Consequently, the United States and 
Nigeria launched a new Binational Commission in April 2010. The agreement 
looks to help forge a greater partnership in improving governance and trans-
parency in Nigeria, with a focus on the Niger Delta. It also looks to increase 
Nigeria’s food security and agricultural development, addressing the need for 
regional and comprehensive approaches to complex crises scenarios.
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Unlike Nigeria, even the modest hope of economic growth has not permeated 
neighboring Niger, where 80 percent of the country is covered by the Sahara Desert. 
Pastoralists have been adapting to and coping with general climate variability for 
centuries in this environment, yet their mobile pastoral system is no longer function-
ing as a natural strategy due to the effects of a changing climate. Many have reluctantly 
settled into villages or migrated to neighboring countries in search of employment. 
At the crossroads of West Africa, Central Africa, and the Maghreb, Niger has 
become a popular international migration route over the past few decades. It sees 
important flows of transit migrants toward the Maghreb countries and Southern 
Europe. While “estimates on transit migrants through Niger are scarce and 
not generally reliable,” according to Anna Di Bartolomeo, Thiba ut Jaulin, and 
Delphine Perrin, recent research registered the passage of 65,000 migrants en 
route to Algeria and Libya from Niger in 2003.”69 
Many migrants, intent on transitioning through northern Morocco to Spain, use 
the dangerous route across the Ténéré desert. About half of all migrants crossing 
Niger originate in the underdeveloped central and southern parts of Nigeria, but 
many others come from Congo, Cameroon, Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte D’Ivoire, 
Guinea, and Ghana. In the 1990s the Nigerien route “rose in importance as a 
consequence of the closure of the Chad-Libyan border and the increased risks of 
the Malian-Algerian itinerary.” 
Agadez, the largest city in northern Niger, today serves as a major link town, the 
departure point for those leaving for Tamanrasset in Algeria and the Sebha oasis 
in Libya.70 The influx became so intense in early 2009 that the United Nations 
expressed concern about the more than tripling of food prices in northern Niger, 
while regional health authorities documented “dangerous levels of food insecu-
rity.”71 Supplies to the local economy of Agadez are dependent upon the trans-
Saharan trade network, which is impacted by banditry in the north and the quality 
of the harvest in the south. 
•	 Rapidly rising food prices and 
dangerously high levels of 
food insecurity are already 
fueling migration.
•	 The rapidly growing popula-
tion is dependent on rainfall 
crops.
•	 Al Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb, Tuareg rebels, and 
other violent nonstate actors 
are positioned to exploit weak 
governance and corruption of 
the state.
Niger
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These pressures are only exacerbated by Niger’s demography. The country has the 
second-highest fertility rate in the world, 49 percent of the population is under 15 
years of age, and life expectancy is 52 years.72
Located in arid and semi-arid regions, Niger is expected to become hotter and more 
prone to drought, erosion, and deforestation with the impacts of climate change. 
The country has seen rapid population growth over the last 50 years and a dramatic 
decrease in arable land. Despite this, the majority of Nigeriens are dependent upon 
rain-fed crops, leaving them extremely vulnerable to variations in climate. 
The burgeoning population, coupled with lower agricultural yields, is also pushing 
people to rely upon the sale of natural resource products such as wood or animal 
fodder (grasses), resulting in forest and pasture loss. In 2005, 2 million Nigeriens 
were threatened by food insecurity and the figure rose to 7.1 million in the 2010 
emi tchouma, near agadez in 
Niger, is facing desertification 
and a harsh existence. 
NatioNal GeoGraphic via ap imaGes
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crisis. Food insecurity and malnutrition threaten a huge share of the Nigerien 
population, resulting in more acute malnutrition among children.73 
In addition, oil prices and exchange rates with Nigeria continually affect Niger’s 
food security. When Nigeria’s oil prices rise and its currency gains value, it 
becomes cheaper to buy grains across the border in Niger where, even in bum-
per harvests, farmers generally have to buy food to supplement their insufficient 
harvests. Thus, similar to the emphasis on livelihood creation in Nigeria, many 
humanitarian organizations working in Niger are trying to go beyond famine relief 
toward diversifying incomes for underproducing farmers. 
Some farmers have diversified by purchasing livestock or working in irrigated 
gardens during the dry seasons, but many more migrate to labor jobs in south-
ern states. Since the food-security situation in Niger is direr than in Nigeria, it is 
crucial to find immediate innovations around food production and access. Food 
security is improved in the short term through measures ranging from drought-
resistant seeds to emergency aid, both aimed toward better insulating the bur-
geoning population from the next drought. While these short-term measures are 
crucial, they must be linked to a longer-term strategy that reduces the continual 
need for emergency agricultural food aid. 
Expanding agricultural land use and the related loss of pasture has led to increases 
in overall migration by Nigerien pastoralists south toward Nigeria in search of 
food and grazing land. Even though seasonal and permanent migration is mainly 
caused by drought and poverty, migration to other areas of Niger or to Nigeria, 
Libya, or West Africa (principally the Ivory Coast) has recently been attributed to 
the August 2010 floods in southeastern Diffa and in central western Agadez, the 
latter of which destroyed half the city and rendered many homeless. Ahmadou 
Bassir, a coordinator for SOS Sahel in Niger, explains: 
There is a sense that [climate change] is occurring in certain zones of the country. 
Notably in Agadez, the habitation isn’t as strong as in other parts of the country. 
… the people from Agadez lose their homes to rain and migrate to the other 
areas of Niger or they go to Nigeria or Libya or another part of West Africa. The 
principal destinations are the Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Libya.74 
According to meteorological records annual rainfall has decreased and is likely to 
continue to decrease. Flooding events may have increased due to isolated heavy 
rainfall, but it is the long-term drought and the increasing prevalence of banditry 
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(due in part to the recent Tuareg rebellion, which we will address below) that has 
pushed people to leave Agadez. 
The country also faces a complex security situation. While Niger maintains a mili-
tary presence at both eastern and western borders, recent incidents of kidnapping 
in Niamey, Niger’s capital city, and proximity to the Mali-Niger “hot zone,” render 
western Niger insecure. Southeast Niger, an oil-rich area where China’s National 
Petroleum Corporation signed a contract in 2008 worth $5 billion to develop 
oil concessions, has seen conflicts related to disputes over rangeland and wells. 
The western border has seen perennial conflict between farmers and herders over 
access to livestock watering points along the Niger River and access to a handful of 
1,600-foot wells in the northwest part of the country.
The Tuareg people inhabiting northern Niger have repeatedly rebelled against 
what they perceive as marginalization by their government. Despite the region’s 
natural resources and widespread development by international corporations with 
the support of the Nigerien government, many Tuaregs feel they have not received 
their fair share of the profits. These grievances exacerbate longstanding ethnic ten-
sions and a troubled past.
Fighting between the Tuareg and the national governments of Mali and Niger 
has a long history with roots in the starvation and marginalization of the Tuareg 
during the famines of the 1970s and 1980s. Some Tuaregs migrated to Algeria and 
Libya in the 1980s to join pan-Arab military groups, returning with training and 
equipment. Additionally, today there are fears that some of the weaponry which 
disappeared during the 2011 fighting in Libya may turn up in Niger and Mali, 
ratcheting up the violence.75 
Such disputes are exacerbated by increased international migration and have the 
potential to replicate patterns of illicit arms and drug trade and terrorist recruit-
ment like those seen in Afghanistan. In the 1990s, and again in 2007, Tuareg 
rebel forces attacked towns, government police and military units, and kidnapped 
foreigners to protest perceived mistreatment. In 2007 the Nigerien government 
was forced to dispatch 4,000 troops to put down the Tuareg rebellion in northern 
Agadez over underdevelopment of the region surrounding the Areva nuclear fuel 
site—the world’s second-biggest uranium mine, valued at $1.5 billion. 
The uprising was similar to the pattern of resource-based rebellion by Tuaregs in Mali, 
and not wholly unlike the so-called resource-rebel situation in the Niger Delta.76 In 
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January 2012 a new Tuareg rebel group, the National Movement for the Liberation of 
Azawad, attacked the town of Menaka in northeast Mali.77 The fear is that this latest 
rebellion—equipped with weapons taken from Libya, according to many reports—
has the potential to spread into the predominantly Tuareg regions of Niger. 
The long-term effect of the Libyan conflict is difficult to assess, but there have 
been reports that Libyan arms, including shoulder-fired, heat-seeking missiles, 
are trickling into Niger, and that displaced groups (many of them former Qaddafi 
forces) could further destabilize the region.78 For example, the BBC reported 
that Tawergha, a Libyan town of 30,000, was “cleansed” because of its role in the 
Libyan conflict and supporters of the old regime driven into Algeria and Niger.79 
Still, the conflict in northern Niger continues to be about the underdevelopment 
of the land. Across this vast area many children cannot find a school or a health 
center, water resources are extremely scarce, and there are very few roads. This 
difficult environment, the lack of government presence, and the current desperate 
conditions of the population have allowed Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to 
find a foothold by playing on the deep-seated resentments of local inhabitants.80 
Security experts argue that Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, based in Algeria and 
with an alleged formal alliance with Al Qaeda has increased its aims to include 
Western targets and regularly kidnaps foreigners.81 
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb also recruits poor tribesmen in Niger by offer-
ing them food and money, which some are eager to accept given their desperate 
circumstances. Algerian intelligence estimates that the regional terrorist group 
raised $100 million from ransom and drug trafficking and used the funds to 
purchase large tracts of land throughout the region, including in Niger, as well 
as weapons used in terrorist attacks in Algeria.82 In 2010,the terrorist group in 
Niger publicly sought to link with Islamists in northern Nigeria,83 and there are 
concerns about the potential threats to the broader region, given the potential 
for Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to benefit from instability caused by mass 
displacement and conflict.
Despite the reported overlap between terrorism and migrants, some experts on the 
ground caution that these conflicts must be seen as distinct from other migration 
pressures. Hassan Mrijam, the chief of mission at UNICEF, argues that the security 
issues occur in Niger’s largest northern city of Agadez, one of the Tuareg federations. 
“There are always problems there with security because of the rebels. … Al Qaeda in 
the Islamic Magreb is in this zone. … it’s a zone with coal and uranium.”84 
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“There are bandits, in the north,” adds Azara Malam Sulley, a technical counselor 
to the president of Niger who works on rural development and the environment. 
Sulley continues:
[Northern Niger] is an area very rich in resources, which are exploited. This isn’t 
Sudan. Those who are armed are isolated, Islamists, Al Qaeda, with links to 
Mali. … climate change, poverty, land degradation, desertification, lack of food, 
and migration are all interlinked, but migration isn’t causing insecurity.85 
Still, it’s long been shown that heavy reliance on extractive industries (instead 
of taxation and representation of rural populations) for government revenue 
reinforces the militarization of resource-based conflicts.86 Governments are under 
pressure to ensure corporate access and accept foreign military assistance to that 
end. In this context the desertification and flooding in Niger, by virtue of depopu-
lating rural areas and cities such as Agadez, is considered a contributing factor in 
the creation of a vacuum in which nonstate actors can operate more freely. 
In addition, desertification and drought create a situation of vulnerability for popula-
tions in the rural areas, pushing them to cities. Migration can also enhance threats in 
this context. Since the Nigerien state curbs transit movements, these patterns:
… progressively [have] developed outside any legal framework. For example, 
all transit migrants, whatever their country of origin and their legal status 
… pay so-called taxes, naturally illegal, at almost every army or police check 
point. Although Algeria and Libya have intensified the fight against irregular 
migration lately, under the pressure of the European Union, the flows of transit 
migrants through Niger have not decreased.87
The European Union is increasing its pressure on Niger to tighten border con-
trols. The recent transformations in North Africa and their uncertain outcomes 
are likely to increase the emphasis on these policies. Over the past two years, 
“European funding has also been aimed at securing the border between Niger and 
Libya, a border that has been generally closed.”88 
General development, adaptation, and climate-change mitigation assistance, 
however, has been inconsistent. For example, when former Nigerien President 
Mamadou Tandja introduced constitutional changes that would have allowed him 
to stay in power indefinitely (he was first elected in 1999), he provoked a politi-
cal crisis in the uranium-rich country in August of 2010. After the military took 
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Tandja into custody and assumed control of the government, most donor activi-
ties were put on hold. 
The U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID, suspended operations 
in the country, and the Peace Corps ended 50 years of operation after several kidnap-
pings—and subsequent killings— stoked fears of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s 
presence in Niger.89 With the return of constitutional rule in 2011, international aid 
has resumed, but American aid is still focused on food security and military training. 
Violence and repeated food crises have stymied adaptation and migration strate-
gies in Niger, as priority has been placed on disaster response and personal inse-
curity. As the presidential election in March 2011 got underway, a voter explained 
that the concern is “rain and crops and availability of food.”90 During the summer 
five soldiers were accused of planning a coup and trying to assassinate President 
Issoufou and only three months later a convoy of ousted Libyan officials including 
one of Moammar Qaddafi’s sons arrived in Agadez. 
The continuing political challenges are worsened by climate change, human 
mobility, and resource pressures which exacerbate Niger’s tenuous food-security 
situation, raising the probability of increased dependence on foreign aid, increased 
incidence of small-scale conflict, and overall human insecurity. Without economic 
diversification, water and land-based conflicts may easily become cross-border 
conflicts that negatively affect Niger’s neighbors. 
Given Niger’s shared border and common cultural connections with Nigeria, 
cooperation between these two nations will be essential to mitigating these risks. As 
Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan acknowledged at the outset of the August 
2011 bilateral talks with Niger, food security in Niger is a priority for Nigeria. 
Jonathan continued to say that “terrorism and transborder crime pose a serious secu-
rity threat to all our countries, so we will strengthen border patrols and other areas of 
cooperation with our neighbors, to ensure the safety of our citizens.”91
It is important to acknowledge that migration and conflict in Niger have their 
roots in the economic desperation of the population, but poverty is caused in 
turn by rapid population growth, environmental degradation, and climate events, 
primarily droughts. Chronic insecurities can break apart households; many young 
men, seeing little hope in agricultural or pastoral life, leave their families and 
societies to seek work. Many Tuareg men ended up in Libya because of the inad-
equacy of their traditional livelihoods. 
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Spanning 2,500 miles and supplying significant biodiversity, the Ni-
ger River is essential to the water needs and livelihoods of nine coun-
tries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte D’Ivoire, Guinea, 
Mali, Niger, and Nigeria. Yet if current climate and water consumption 
trends continue, water withdrawal from the Niger basin will increase 
six-fold by 2025. There are plans for up to 20 new dams to be built 
along the river, which would greatly diminish flow, while thousands 
of ongoing oil and wastewater spills from oil production will continue 
to degrade water quality. 
The migratory repercussions of these trends have not yet figured into 
projections, but “zones of tension” have been identified where climate 
change has the potential to increase the risk of conflict in West Africa. 
The results of the population-resource pressures could result in 
migration affecting the region, including the area between western 
Nigeria and Niger.92 
The largest potential cause of conflict is water scarcity caused by 
rapidly increasing demand and dwindling resources. Nigeria has 
historically opposed upriver dam projects on the Niger River (in Ni-
ger or Mali) that would reduce their annual inflow volume by more 
than 10 percent. With recent drops in the Niger River’s average an-
nual flows of 20 percent to 50 percent, this situation could become 
a national political issue—even if these decreases are in fact being 
caused by changes in the climate (and not up-river projects), the 
decreases in flow have the potential to add to international tension 
in the region. 93 
Also, sudden migration could be triggered by flooding of poorly 
maintained dams. In August and September 2010, for example, 
130,000 people were displaced in northwestern Nigeria when a spill-
way from the Goronyo dam burst after heavy rains, creating food and 
shelter shortages and the conditions for disease outbreaks.94
As conflict analysts have long pointed out, multilateral water shar-
ing—in this case among Niger, Cameroon, and Chad—could either 
lead to greater conflict among wetland communities or greater 
cooperation through joint-management schemes such as the Niger 
Basin Authority. The current 2008 Niger Basin Water Charter, for ex-
ample, is a 30-year investment and five-year plan for Integrated Water 
Resources Management. Despite financial support, the authority has 
been mired in legal and staffing issues and other capacity related 
problems, prompting Nigerian President Jonathan Goodluck to 
demand these issues be resolved and a coherent and comprehensive 
strategy be implemented.95 
As political pressure mounts for forward-looking management of the 
Niger River, the rapid decline of Lake Chad, where Nigeria’s northeast-
ern and Niger’s southeastern corners meet, is considered a grimmer 
situation. Lake Chad and its floodplains and wetlands support an esti-
mated 20 million people, projected to rise to 35 million by 2020.96 Its 
waters support communities along the river with fishing, agriculture, 
grazing, nontimber products, and fuel wood. But the wetlands have 
been intensively cultivated and used by nomadic pastoral groups for 
grazing during the dry season, leaving the ecosystem exhausted.
While Lake Chad has been receding for decades and has survived 
previous dry periods, climate change is blamed for speeding the 
process. Climate change shrinks the water surface on two fronts—
reducing rainfall and speeding water evaporation through higher 
temperatures. The great fear (and likely future outcome) is that Lake 
Chad will disappear completely. Pastoralists who migrate south from 
the lake, along with the farmers and fishermen moving from the lake 
to Yaoundé in Cameroon, have seen their average household income 
fall by more than half in recent years. These families view migration as 
their only choice under existing conditions, and have been referred to 
as climate migrants.97 
Further, dam building in the region and transboundary changes in 
water allocation could create tensions and conflicts, for example 
in the lower Komadugu, a tributary to the Yobe River system that 
runs through Nigeria and Niger into Lake Chad. The Hadejia-Nguru 
wetland—Nigeria’s most important, supporting half the people 
living in the Basin area—has also decreased by two-thirds due to 
dams and drought. 
The Lake Chad Basin Commission (with Cameroon, Chad, Niger, 
Nigeria, and the Central African Republic as members under United 
Nations Development Programme supervision) has asked for inter-
national support to dam the Oubangui River in the Central African 
Republic to channel water, but feasibility studies have not been 
completed, the charter regulation of water use (along with Algeria, 
Sudan, and Libya) has not been enforced, and neither effort has been 
linked to climate adaptation.98
Cross-border riparian risks—A sub-arc of tension
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For these reasons, governance plays a major role in addressing the nexus of climate 
change, migration, and conflict in Niger. Much of the conflict could be avoided if 
governance systems were more reliable and less corrupt. While the Tuareg case 
takes the shape of a natural-resources conflict, the roots of the struggle go back to 
the fact that both the governments in Mali and Niger have systematically margin-
alized the Tuareg people by ignoring their livelihood needs, denying them terri-
tory, and failing to aid them during serious natural disasters. 
N’Djamena
Bamako
Ouagadougou
Accra
Yamoussoukro
Freetown
Conakry
Monrovia
Niamey
Abuja
Lomé Porto-Novo
Lake Chad
Niger River
Lake
Volta
Niger River Basin
Perennial rivers
Temporary rivers
Selected monitoring stations
Cities/monitoring stations
Hydrographic boundaries
MAURITANIA
CHAD
BURKINA
FASO
CÔTE D’IVOIRE
GHANALIBERIA
SIERRA
LEONE
CAMEROON
GUINEA
SENEGAL
TO
G
O
BE
N
IN
ALGERIA
NIGER
NIGERIA
MALI
Northwest Africa’s complex riverine matrix
Source: The World Bank, “The Niger River Basin: 
A Vision for Sustainable Management,” 2005.

 algeria | www.americanprogress.org 39
Algeria is generally not identified among the group of countries most vulnerable to 
climate change. In fact, in the World Bank’s 2009 rankings of the dozen countries 
most at risk from climate threats in five categories—drought, flood, storm, coastal 
inundation, and agriculture—Algeria appeared near the end of the list.99 Yet even 
though the country may be facing less dire predictions than some other Middle 
Eastern and African nations, it still has significant points of climate change vulnerabil-
ity, some of which will overlap with existing human mobility and security concerns. 
A growing body of research suggests that those migrants who reach Algeria 
from the sub-Saharan states, whatever the precise mix of factors that drive 
them, will face an increasingly uncertain climate. The industrialized democra-
cies’ Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development warns that the 
Maghreb region as a whole will confront increasing temperatures, decreasing rain-
fall, and a rising sea level as climate change progresses. By 2020 these countries 
may see “a temperature increase of 1º Celsius (1.8 º Fahrenheit) and a reduction in 
rainfall likely to reach 10 percent.”100 
Extreme weather events have already caused mass displacement in Algeria. In 
2001 flash floods and mudslides killed hundreds and left thousands homeless. 
The United Nations reports that more than 45,000 people were affected.101 These 
natural disasters—and the resulting humanitarian disruptions—are likely to occur 
more frequently in the years to come.
Another concern in Algeria and other Maghreb countries will be the lack of 
water. Despite desalinization projects, Algeria ranks second among African 
countries in terms of water scarcity.102 As the World Resources Institute notes, 
such shortages could lead to problems with “both food production and eco-
nomic development unless the region is wealthy enough to apply new technolo-
gies for water conservation and re-use.”103 
•	 Algeria has confronted 
nearly 1,000 acts of terrorism 
since 2001 and now hosts a 
regional counterterrorism 
command center.
•	 Water scarcity, rising tem-
peratures, erosion, and other 
effects of climate change 
will place increased pressure 
on the vulnerable Algerian 
government.
•	 Major migration routes to Mo-
rocco run through Algerian 
territory, creating vulnerabil-
ity to climate-driven transit 
migration from sub-Saharan 
Africa.
Algeria
Algeria: Fast facts
40 center for american progress | climate change, migration, and conflict in Northwest africa
If these advances are not achieved, domestic food insecurity has the potential to 
spark domestic security concerns. In January 2011 Algeria experienced food riots 
that left two people dead and 300 injured. While these events were also fed by dis-
satisfaction with the country’s overall economic health, Voice of America reported 
that “the unrest began … after the sudden price hike of food staples such as flour, 
sugar, and oil.”104 Understanding how climate-driven tensions, whether sparked 
by rising food prices or an increasingly overburdened government, will intersect 
with the pressure of a growing migrant community in Algeria will be a key policy 
challenge in the coming decades. 
Desertification also has the potential to substantially increase the pressure on 
Algeria. About 87 percent of Algeria’s landmass falls within the Sahara Desert, 
where the population is sparse. U.N. data shows that “over 90 percent of Algerians 
live along the Mediterranean coast on only 12 percent of the country’s land.”105 
Between 1990 and 2005 the country demonstrated progress increasing the 
amount of land covered by forest, growing from 0.8 percent to 1 percent cover. 
But desertification has already taken a toll on Algeria, and some of the damage may 
be irreversible. Between 1996 and 2006 some 130,000 square kilometers of land 
were lost to the desert.106 While the human causes of desertification—such as unsus-
tainable forestry practices—must be addressed, climate change also plays a role.107 
According to the United Nations, the Algerian government is moving forward 
with efforts to slow desertification through reforestation projects, but “irrigation-
induced soil salinity, overgrazing, and forest fires … continue to degrade vulner-
able lands, especially in the semi-arid plains just north of the Sahara Desert.”108 But 
it should be noted that the unpredictability of high-altitude winds, which affect 
the rains and are incredibly difficult to model, means that future climate patterns 
in the region are very difficult to determine.109 
Some evidence supports the idea that eastern parts of the Sahara Desert, largely 
in Egypt and Sudan, are gradually increasing vegetation cover—this was the key 
finding of a 2009 study that identified “extensive re-greening” in those parts of the 
Sahara and Sahel. It is unclear whether this trend will extend to Algeria. 110
Whether and when desertification can be ameliorated in the Sahel belt is a critical 
question for Algeria and one that ties together all elements of the climate, migra-
tion, and security nexus. According to Saib Musette of the Algerian Research 
Center for Applied Economics and Development, the advancement of the Sahara 
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Desert both to the north and the south is the central problem of the climate-migra-
tion nexus in that region. Musette argues that the southern spread of the Sahara, 
combined with drought, is driving seasonal migration from sub-Saharan Africa 
toward southern Algeria. Some of these migrants intend to travel onward to the 
European Union but get stuck in Algeria with no permanent employment options.111 
Algeria has a long history as a sending country. Indeed, Jim House of the 
University of Leeds notes that “the migration of colonized Arab-Berbers from 
Algeria to mainland France was the earliest and the most extensive of all colonial 
migrations to Western Europe before the 1960s.”112 This economically motivated 
migration was initially temporary, but as entire families began to migrate in the 
mid-20th century, it became a more permanent phenomenon. In the years fol-
lowing Algeria’s successful struggle for independence, however, France gradually 
sought to limit movement between the two countries, and by the 1980s immigra-
tion had surfaced as a significant issue in French politics.113
Today Algeria faces an increasingly complex relationship with migration. The 
movement of Algerians into Europe continues: According to the EU-financed 
Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration, in 2008 (the most 
recent year for which figures are available) the European Union recorded receiving 
some 811,826 migrants from Algeria, while Algeria reported that 1,118,674 emi-
grants had left the country for the European Union.114 In addition to direct migra-
tion between Algeria and Europe, the country also serves as a transit corridor 
for sub-Saharan migrants moving into Libya and Morocco, and an unintentional 
destination for migrants who are unable to cross into neighboring countries and, 
ultimately, Europe. These people may spend weeks, months, or years in secondary 
destination countries such as Algeria. 
Transit migration highlights the vulnerability of these stateless migrants to changing 
environmental conditions in Algeria, but also underscores Algeria’s vulnerability to 
climate variation in migration-sending countries. The effects of climate change may 
be more pronounced in these countries, driving large numbers of people to leave 
their homes. Existing labor-migration routes link Algeria to Niger and Nigeria in the 
southern segments of the arc of tension, but also to Mali and Senegal by land, and 
countries such as Benin, Liberia, Cameroon, and others by air.115 
The World Bank rankings indicate that Niger faces significant climate threats from 
drought and changes in the agricultural sector. Senegal, too, is highly vulnerable to 
coastal sea-level rise, and Benin is among the countries most at risk from floods.116 
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Many climate migrants from these sending countries pass through Algeria, and 
some will remain there. Upon arrival in Algeria these migrants will join an already 
significant population of internally displaced persons. 
The decade of violence between Algerian government forces and Islamic 
opposition groups was largely brought to a close by the early 2000s, but signifi-
cant internal displacement remains. The estimates of displacement following 
that conflict range from 1 million to 1.5 million. The Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre in Switzerland, an international body that monitors human 
mobility, notes that the government has “largely not disputed those figures.”117 
While the government of Algeria claims that these “internally displaced per-
sons” are no longer displaced, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 
argues that no proof of resettlement has been provided, and “it is likely that 
most of these migrants have remained in the cities they fled to … as access to 
livelihoods in rural areas has remained very limited.”118 
The trend of advancing desertification pushing sub-Saharan migrants north into 
Algeria’s already overpopulated urban areas also highlights the risks associated 
with ungoverned spaces in the context of Algeria’s tenuous domestic-security 
situation. Although the violence of the 1990s has been significantly reduced, 
Algeria is now one of the hotspots for terrorism on the African continent. Al 
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb emerged from the remains of the Salafist Group 
for Preaching and Combat, one of the parties that fought the Algerian govern-
ment in the 1990s. The regional terrorist group has engaged in kidnappings, 
arms and drug trafficking, and carried out a number of high-profile bombings in 
Algeria and neighboring countries. 
According to research from Yonah Alexander of the Potomac Institute for Policy 
Studies, the Maghreb and Sahel countries have suffered 1,103 incidents of terror-
ism since September 11, 2001. Of this total Algeria has sustained 938, including 
168 in 2010 alone.119 Not all of these attacks can be attributed to Al Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb, but the group poses a real risk to the Algerian state’s ability to 
maintain control over its borders. Alexander notes that Al Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb conducts training in “the ungoverned regions of the Sahara and Sahel.”120 
The terrorist group also takes advantage of lax border control to move kidnapping 
victims from Algeria deeper into the desert in states like Mali. In the past few years 
the group has also shifted personnel, leaving northern posts for the less-regulated 
south and southwest Algeria.121
In response to the threat of terrorist operations in these ungoverned areas, Algeria, 
Mauritania, Mali, and Niger are cooperating on a joint military command center 
in the southern Algeria city of Tamanrasset. The joint center is intended to coor-
dinate operations and information sharing to aid in efforts to confront Al Qaeda 
in the Islamic Maghreb and deter trafficking across the members’ borders.122 
The potential security implications of open spaces are also of concern to the 
United States. The U.S. State Department is currently leading the Trans-Saharan 
Counterterrorism Partnership, which encompasses all of the states along the arc of 
tension, along with five other countries. 
This partnership, in coordination with the Pentagon and USAID, is aiming to facili-
tate greater cooperation among states in the region, strengthen their counterterror-
ism capabilities, and discredit terrorist ideologies, among other goals.123 As of 2008, 
however, the U.S. Government Accountability Office, the nonpartisan investigative 
arm of Congress, expressed concern about the lack of interagency coordination and 
counterterrorism metrics for the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership and 
it is not clear whether these issues have been resolved.124 
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, of course, is not the only group that takes advan-
tage of the opportunity to cross poorly supervised borders in southern Algeria. 
Tamanrasset is also a major transit hub for migrants moving into the state from 
sub-Saharan Africa. Last year 12 migrants from Cameroon, Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Senegal, Gambia, and Guinea died in the desert outside Tamanrasset after their 
truck broke down and the group ran out of food and water.125 
Those migrants who are successful in reaching Tamanrasset, and other cities along 
the major migration route to Morocco, encounter a state with little capacity to 
assist them. As Professor Jean-Pierre Cassarino of the Maghreb Return Migration 
Project at the European University Institute in Italy notes, the Algerian state’s 
migration policy is “quite missing.” Although there are initiatives in place for the 
Algerian diaspora, migrants moving into the country from outside of the country 
are left at the mercy of an ad hoc system.126
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The arc of tension ends in Morocco, one of Africa’s most stable states. The move-
ment of migrants, however, does not stop there—many use Morocco as a depar-
ture point for the final journey into Europe, either by sea toward the continent or 
by land over the fences separating Morocco from Ceuta and Melilla, two Spanish 
enclaves on Morocco’s northern coast. Of those who are unable to make the cross-
ing successfully, some will join Morocco’s sizable population of illegal immigrants, 
while others may be apprehended and deported. As in the other segments of the 
arc, this human drama is occurring within an increasingly intersecting network of 
environmental and security factors. 
Professor Mehdi Lahlou of the Institut National de Statistique et d’Economie 
Appliquée in Morocco explains that his interviews with Moroccan and sub-
Saharan migrants rarely turn up direct climate-migration links at first glance. But 
Lahlou notes that “after a discussion about their situation, about their origin, 
where they were living, and the trends of their economic sector,” he has reason 
to believe that climate change, in the form of decreased rain and reduced returns 
on crop land, is the most important factor in migration from poor, rural areas in 
Morocco and other origin countries like Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso.127 
Anna di Bartolomeo of the Consortium for Applied Research on International 
Migration confirms that “looking at historical trends, we can say for sure that 
climatic conditions (and especially droughts) have played a role in urbanization.” 
She singles out drought as a contributory factor in rural-to-urban shifts Morocco 
and Algeria.128 A 2009 report on climate change in North Africa, commissioned 
for the office of the U.S. director of national intelligence, confirms this trend, 
reporting that “climatic data from Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia indicate that the 
frequency of droughts increased from approximately one per decade to 5-to-6 per 
decade during the course of the 20th century.”129
Morocco’s coastal areas are at particular risk from climate change. Coastal erosion is 
already claiming three feet of coastline per year in some northern areas. A rising sea 
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level may only exacerbate this development, leading to greater salinity of low-lying 
freshwater sources. Farmers near the mouth of Morocco’s Moulouya River (which 
empties into the Mediterranean Sea in the north) have already seen increased salin-
ity in the aquifers used to support their crops. As a result, they have moved away 
from vegetable crops toward cereals that can handle the saltier water.130 
Morocco’s own National Meteorological Directorate predicts a decrease in rainfall 
in the country of 20 percent to 30 percent by the end of the 21st century, a develop-
ment that is likely to place further stress on freshwater supplies.131 This is particularly 
critical because agriculture represents nearly 15 percent of Morocco’s gross domestic 
product and employs 40 percent of its population, according to the World Bank’s 
most recent numbers.132 Although some models suggest that climate change will 
aid some agricultural production in Morocco—notably maize yields, which may 
respond positively to increased concentrations of carbon dioxide—it is also likely to 
increase water scarcity in this important industry. Morocco and Algeria may lose 10 
percent to 15 percent of their water resources over the next decade.133
The precise effects of climate change in Morocco will vary by region. But it is clear 
that climate change has the potential to place increasing stress on the Moroccan 
government and economy as the country simultaneously confronts the stresses 
induced by migration—partially driven by climate factors. 
Migration is very much on the mind of Moroccans. Polling conducted by Gallup 
in 2010, before the current round of uprisings in North Africa, found that 37 
percent of people surveyed in Morocco would undertake permanent migration 
or temporary migration for work if they had the opportunity to do so.134 And 
according to Professor Gayle Allard of the Instituto de Empresa in Madrid, recent 
efforts by the Spanish government to create incentives for Moroccan immigrants 
to return to their country of origin have been largely unsuccessful.135
In addition to the transit of Moroccans to Europe, the country is a key destination 
for sub-Saharan migrants moving north. Many of these migrants reach Morocco 
from northern Algeria. The land border between those two countries has been 
closed since 1994, a state of affairs that is unlikely to be resolved without some 
movement on broader bilateral security issues explained below. Yet the illegal tran-
sit of goods and migrants continues near Oujda, which serves as the entry point 
for almost three-quarters of the illegal migrants crossing into Morocco. Once 
across the border, some of these migrants settle into camps where, “according to 
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local sources, migrants live in constant fear of the possibility of police raids at any 
moment and [of] the violent mafia-like organizations that manage the camp.”136
In the past, Moroccan authorities have chosen to expel migrants by abandon-
ing them in the middle of the night along the closed border with Algeria, an area 
characterized by the charity organization Doctors Without Borders as a “no-
man’s land.” After 600 to 700 migrants, including pregnant women and children, 
were left in this area in September 2010, “at risk of being attacked and robbed by 
bandits and smugglers who operate in the area,” the organization noted that the 
migrants “faced the choice of returning to Oujda on foot or trying to cross to the 
Algerian side of the border.”137 
Doctors Without Borders observed that, of the migrants displaced in the 
September 2010 raids, those who made their way back to Oujda were “completely 
destitute.” For environmentally induced migrants, this vulnerability on the receiv-
ing end exasperates frequently degraded living standards experienced in their 
home countries. While Doctors Without Borders did not provide information on 
the factors driving that particular group of migrants, the anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that environmental factors are beginning to play to a role in the decision to 
migrate into or through Morocco. 
The Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla are key destinations for illegal migrants 
seeking to enter Europe. Both enclaves are now protected by sophisticated border 
fences, including motion detectors and cameras to detect illegal crossings.138 This 
has not, however, entirely prevented attempts to enter Spanish territory through 
those illegal crossings. In 2005 efforts by hundreds of migrants to break through 
the fences into Ceuta and Melilla led both Spain and Morocco to increase security 
forces around the enclaves. If climate change contributes to increasing migration 
north from sub-Saharan Africa, attempts to cross over into Spanish territory are 
likely to become even more frequent.
Changes in climate within Morocco may also facilitate the growth of security 
challenges related to migration. As noted by a conference paper on climate change 
in North Africa prepared for the U.S. director of national intelligence, “differential 
climatic impacts in particular areas may drive rural populations to migrate into 
new rural areas with more abundant resources and less climatic stress.” This, how-
ever, may create rural-rural tensions over resources, according to the report.
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Climate-driven internal migration also has the potential to aggravate existing social 
divisions. The director of national intelligence report suggests that “the combination 
of water scarcity and stress on marginal agriculture could drive more Berber speakers 
into Arab-speaking coastal communities, creating a potential for ethnic conflict.”139
Climate-driven migration also has the potential to more broadly influence Morocco’s 
national security agenda. As noted by the director of national intelligence paper, 
migration from North Africa to Europe alleviates pressure on resources and the 
labor market in the Maghreb, yet “climate change is expected to significantly exac-
erbate both of these challenges.”140 This will be of particular concern for Morocco 
due to the position of Ceuta and Melilla on its northern coastline, its proximity to 
continental Europe, and its ongoing struggles with domestic extremists. 
The continued high-profile presence of those enclaves in Morocco has attracted 
not only migrants, but also the attention of extremist organizations such as Al 
a coastguard boat tows a small 
boat carrying 85 would-be 
immigrants into the port of 
los cristianos on the canary 
island of tenerife, spain, in 
2006. 292 immigrants arrived 
in three small boats in tenerife 
as spain renewed its appeal 
for the european union to do 
more to halt a flood of illegal 
migration from africa, saying 
the problem is one of the 
bloc’s main challenges of the 
new century and spain cannot 
handle it alone. more than 
23,000 migrants have made 
dangerous ocean crossings 
from northwest africa to 
spain’s canary islands so far, 
leading to the drowning of 
many and a near collapse of 
holding facilities on the islands. 
the associateD press/arturo roDriGuez
 morocco | www.americanprogress.org 51
Qaeda. Ayman al-Zawahiri, who has now ascended to the top spot in Al Qaeda’s 
central organization after the killing of Osama bin Laden, has repeatedly called for 
his followers to liberate the Spanish enclaves.141 In Ceuta almost half of the Muslim 
residents are clustered in the Principe neighborhood, where in 2006 Spanish police 
charged seven men with planning terrorist attacks. A 2007 Time magazine report 
noted that Principe is “sorely lacking in everything from police and sanitation services 
to job opportunities. But there’s no shortage of weapons on the streets.” Javier Jordan 
of the University of Grenada characterized the enclave as “in a pre-jihadist stage.”142 
USAID’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation has partnered with the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for International Studies to look 
into the drivers of, and responses to, urban violence.143 This fieldwork is cur-
rently underway, and the results should inform policy toward cities like Lagos, 
Tangier, or Agadez, where the stresses of incoming migration could create simi-
larly volatile urban dynamics.
The extremist threat in Morocco differs from the Algerian experience in both 
frequency and content. Between 2001 and 2010 Morocco endured only seven 
terrorist attacks—two in 2003 and five in 2007—while Algeria faced more than 
a thousand.144 Unlike Algeria, Morocco’s threat is largely internal—local, self-
radicalizing terrorist cells are a significant concern—rather than transnational 
(although domestic groups may have global ambitions).145 The Moroccan Islamic 
Combatant Group, active since 1993, and Salafia Jihadia, which evolved from the 
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, are domestic groups that aim to remake 
Morocco as a traditional Islamic state.146 Salafia Jihadia was responsible for a series 
of bombings in Casablanca in May 2003 that killed 45 people, one of the most 
gruesome recent attacks in Morocco. Suicide bombers also struck Casablanca in 
2007, although no single group has been identified as the sponsor of that incident. 
There have been no confirmed successful attacks by Al Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb within Morocco to date, although this should not be taken as evidence 
that the group is not operating within the state.147 An April 2011 café bombing 
in Marrakesh bore the hallmarks of an Al Qaeda operation, although the origins 
have not been confirmed, and at least one European source noted in the aftermath 
of that attack that Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb had entered into cooperation 
with the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group.148 
Moreover, suspected Al Qaeda members have been identified in Morocco. In 
January of 2011 Moroccan authorities arrested 27 people that it alleged were mem-
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bers of a terrorist cell, including, it claimed, “a member of Al Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb who was tasked by this organization to set up a rear base in Morocco 
where it would plan terrorist acts.” The government alleged that the group had 
planned to take advantage of training camps in Mali and Algeria in order to prepare 
potential attackers for a domestic operation.149 The presence of Moroccan extremists 
in Pakistan and Iraq has fed fears that foreign-trained extremists will return to the 
country with the experience needed to carry out more damaging attacks.150 
As previously noted, regional efforts are underway to confront Al Qaeda’s operations 
in North Africa. Yet, while Morocco is a participant in the U.S.-led Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership, it is not involved in the regional counterterrorism 
command center project in Tamanrasset, in which Algeria has a leadership role and 
thus more sway over the membership of the group. This disconnect, in the face of 
otherwise significant counterterrorism efforts and cooperation with the United 
States, stems in part from the poor state of relations between Morocco and Algeria, a 
diplomatic breakdown rooted in disagreement over the Western Sahara territory.151
Morocco has long claimed sovereignty over Western Sahara, a former possession of 
colonial Spain. However, the issue is not merely an internal concern. Morocco’s claim 
has been violently opposed by the indigenous Polisario Front, a group that receives 
significant support from neighboring Algeria. And, while frosty relations between 
Morocco and Algeria predate the Western Sahara conflict, Algeria’s recognition of a 
Polisario-led Saharan Arab Democratic Republic and tolerance for its refugee camps 
within its territory have long been a source of tension between Algeria and Morocco. 
The failure to find a lasting solution regarding the Western Sahara has under-
mined regional initiatives in the Maghreb, such as the Arab Maghreb Union, 
and is behind Morocco’s refusal to join the African Union. Jacob Mundy of the 
Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies believes the dispute has “retarded regional 
security cooperation against transnational terrorist groups.”152 Whether these poor 
relations also have an impact on regional efforts to confront the effects of climate 
change remains to be seen.
Although Morocco is not among the countries most vulnerable to climate change, 
its unique mixture of climate vulnerabilities, human mobility, and security 
concerns suggests that much closer attention should be given to this nexus as the 
effects of climate change emerge. If climate does drive increased migrant flows 
from sub-Saharan Africa while pressuring Morocco’s domestic environment and 
economy, the country’s position at the edge of Africa and Europe will be of critical 
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importance. Moroccan authorities will need to manage the economic and social 
consequences of the climate-mobility nexus while also addressing significant 
domestic security concerns, notably the potential for climate change, migration, 
and security to intersect in the Spanish enclaves. 
These efforts will be handicapped by feeble regional cooperation, pressure from 
the European Union to control the movement of migrants heading north, and 
the unpredictable effects of climate change itself. The more important question 
is, “What can be done to boost regional cooperation by the United States and the 
international community?” We turn to this question in the next section.
The challenges we describe in this report affect women and men 
differently, which means the solutions for these problems must incor-
porate an understanding of gender in responses to complex crises. 
First and foremost, women are disproportionately represented in 
the rural agricultural sector in Northwest Africa, which means many 
women in the region will bear the brunt of the problems associated 
with climate change, migration, and security.
Large segments of the people in these countries are dependent on 
agriculture. Approximately 90 percent of workers in Niger are en-
gaged in agriculture and this dependence is complicated by the de-
crease in arable land in those nations. Women constitute the majority 
of small farmers in many regions of Sahelian and sub-Saharan Africa, 
thus bearing the brunt of the environmental degradation.153
What’s more, rapid population growth in the region compounds the 
problem. Niger boasts the world’s second-highest fertility rate, and 
rapid population growth in Nigeria means its population is projected 
to double by 2050.154 Women are the primary caregivers for children 
in these nations while also doing much of the agricultural work. Ac-
cess to family planning, reproductive health services, and education 
would allow women the ability to make choices about reproduction. 
Women are at more risk from the nexus of climate change, migra-
tion, and security for other reasons. A number of studies indicate that 
women are more vulnerable to natural disasters and that female life 
expectancy is disproportionately affected by such disasters.155 Women 
and girls are put in harm’s way when they have to spend more time 
and travel longer distances to collect water, wood, and other resources 
and services, especially in conflict areas. And girls are kept out of school 
and women can’t attain fair-compensation employment in the formal 
sector because of these duties. 
This intersection of climate change and gender is being more widely 
discussed at the international level, as evidenced by the integration 
of gender-sensitive language in the text during the 17th Confer-
ence of the Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate 
Change in South Africa.156 Yet the consequences of these challenges 
facing women in Northwest Africa and around the world means the 
importance of a gender-based approach to solutions require more 
attention in international conversations about climate change, migra-
tion, and security. 
Worldwide, women constitute nearly three-quarters of the world’s 
poor and in many rural areas in the developing world are responsible 
for providing their families with food. Despite women’s widespread 
reliance on working the land and natural resources, they often do not 
have land rights, a fact which limits their access to credit and invest-
ments in sustainable practices.157 
Climate migration gender gap
Continued on next page
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Environmental migration and the challenges associated with climate 
change have the potential to provide opportunities to empower wom-
en because the absence of men (who are usually the migrants) allows 
women to assume nontraditional roles back home. These trends could 
shift gender norms in ways that empower women who remain at home 
while men work abroad.158 Additionally, addressing climate change 
through sustainable agricultural practices that enhance resilience and 
by the burgeoning of clean energy technologies can diminish gender 
disparities in income and employment while improving food security 
and cultivating economic growth.159 Policies that address climate 
change, migration, and security can remove traditional barriers that 
endanger women and limit their full participation in the economy. 
When it comes to women migrating, whether forced to do so because 
of violence or due to environmental factors, women are often ex-
posed to gender-based violence in refugee camps—a fact that must 
be considered in postcrisis responses (such as the previously men-
tioned emergency shelters in the Nigerien city of Agadez discussed 
on page 17 of this report). The lack of health, social, and environmen-
tal services in small, poor urban centers and informal settlements is a 
heavy burden on women because of their asymmetric domestic care 
responsibilities. Other gender dimensions to migration include the 
question of opportunities for employment after relocation, safe-
guards for domestic labor, and general access to scarce labor markets. 
To achieve a greater degree of resilience, it is important to guarantee 
women’s equal access to education, employment, family planning, 
and participation in family decision making. To this end, it is impor-
tant that gender language continues to be integrated in the U.N. 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and other international 
bodies. Gender should also be a component of adaptation and miti-
gation plans, migration policies, and poverty policies in urban areas. 
Finally, women should be incorporated into the planning of infra-
structure developments on which they rely as the primary caregiver 
in most families in this region.
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Addressing climate change, migration, and political and social 
insecurity in the arc of tension
Many of today’s security concerns are transnational in nature, requiring a renewed 
emphasis on global governance. Pressing challenges, particularly those resulting 
from transformational forces like climate change and migration, require a collab-
orative international approach. Conflicts and complex crisis scenarios resulting 
from such shifts demand nontraditional security approaches, eschewing tradi-
tional conceptions of “hard security” to focus on economic development, the rule 
of law, and human rights. A “sustainable security” approach—facilitating inter-
national cooperation to integrate defense, diplomacy, and development—will be 
better able to address complex problems such as the nexus of climate, migration, 
and security that is the focus of this paper. 
Concurrently, the sources of foreign assistance and donor-recipient relations are 
undergoing rapid change due in part to the rise of new global economic actors 
such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China—the so-called BRIC countries—and the 
rise of private-sector investment and philanthropy over the last decade. Foreign 
aid is regularly discussed during BRIC meetings; China has grown its foreign 
assistance at a 30 percent rate annually, and the four BRIC countries collectively 
doubled humanitarian assistance between 2005 and 2008. 
In addition, over the past decade official development assistance has accounted for 
a decreasing proportional share of donor nations’ economic engagement with the 
developing world as private financial flows have come to predominate. The Hudson 
Institute’s most recent annual study noted that, in 2009, official U.S. development 
assistance accounted for only 13 percent of total U.S. net economic engagement 
with developing countries, while private philanthropy accounted for 17 percent.160
The United States is facing the dual challenge of reforming its own foreign-assistance 
programs and the administrative structure of the relevant government agencies 
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while also refining the core strengths of these programs and agencies. Fraught with 
bureaucratic peril in the best of times, this task is made more difficult in an era of fiscal 
constraint and a competitive global environment for foreign-assistance partnerships. 
This process will require the U.S. foreign-assistance framework to streamline efforts in 
the face of declining taxpayer resources. The same dynamic is playing out in many of 
the other major foreign-assistance donor countries in the developed world.
The United States needs to lead efforts to coordinate development policies and 
establish a more coherent international approach to ensure that austerity mea-
sures in developed nations do not cripple foreign-assistance programs at a time 
when the nexus of climate change, migration, and security poses serious threats to 
global prosperity and national security. These changes in U.S. foreign assistance 
are driven by a growing recognition that effective reform is needed to effectively 
address crisis scenarios in the face of severe budget crisis and increasing engage-
ment from new international powers such as China, Brazil, India, and Turkey. 
The United States has an opportunity to harness international cooperation in 
addressing these issues, but officials must also consider where the U.S. govern-
ment’s comparative advantage lies. In a period of declining resources looking at 
what is feasible and achievable is even more critical. This has prompted the United 
States to review its current capabilities and the way it interacts with both the 
developed and developing world. Global challenges are so diverse and so complex 
that a new division of labor is necessary to achieve sustainable long-term eco-
nomic and social development in at-risk regions like Northwest Africa.
New U.S. policy approaches 
The Obama administration is seeking to transform U.S. global engagement to meet 
the challenges of the 21st century. The administration’s 2010 National Security 
Strategy and the Defense Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review outlined the 
emerging strategic environment facing the United States—highlighting the growing 
role of emerging countries and the further diffusion of global political, economic, 
and military power. The two reports are complemented by the first-ever Quadrennial 
Diplomacy and Development Review, as well as by the Presidential Policy Directive 
on Global Development, which look to add cohesion to the proliferation of govern-
ment agencies involved in U.S. foreign and national security policy.161
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All four of these reviews acknowledge climate change as a major factor in plan-
ning global development and security strategies. These reviews represent good 
initial efforts to widen our national security perspective to incorporate human 
security in determining the allocation of resources. Yet the current national 
security stance in Northwest Africa does not yet fully reflect these new priori-
ties, with resources allocated primarily through the military apparatus and 
focused on traditionally hard security issues. 
The numbers match this focus: The fiscal year 2012 budget request for the U.S. 
Africa Command, or AFRICOM, was $289.7 million.162 Implemented through 
AFRICOM by the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Defense, and 
USAID, the request for theatre security cooperation for FY 2012 beginning in 
October of that year was up slightly to $40.4 million.163 
Going forward AFRICOM will share responsibilities for humanitarian response with 
USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, implementing the West and North 
Africa Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy. These programs are efforts to effectively 
coordinate defense, diplomacy, and development, but the actual funding commit-
ments are still very much rooted in more traditional conceptions of national security.
This is reflected by the Department of Defense’s programs in the region, which 
focus on counterterrorism and hard security, rather than a broad view of human 
security. U.S. military assistance for fiscal year 2011 to Nigeria provided $50,000 
for nonproliferation and counterterrorism programs, $965,000 for military 
education and training, and $1.35 million in general foreign military funding. 
Under a Defense Department counterterrorism training and equipment initiative 
known as the Section 1206 Program, which provides aid to 53 countries includ-
ing Nigeria (FY 2012 request was $500 million), Nigeria will receive maritime 
surveillance gear to monitor traffic in the Gulf of Guinea.164 
Although France is the primary provider of military assistance to Niger, the U.S. 
European Command has contributed to humanitarian assistance as AFRICOM 
has worked to build up its capabilities; some $15 million was provided in 2010 
under the Food for Peace program. Algeria, meanwhile, received $950,000 in 
counterterrorism funding and $950,000 in military education training funding 
in 2010. Morocco was the largest beneficiary of U.S. security assistance across 
the arc of tension in 2010, receiving $1.2 million in counterterrorism funding, 
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$1.8 million for military education and training, and $9 million in foreign mili-
tary funding.165 It will be important to continue to expand AFRICOM’s nascent 
capabilities, but long-term U.S. and international security cannot be achieved 
through the overused domain of the Pentagon. 
The climate, migration, and conflict nexus is one challenge that will create both 
questions and opportunities for U.S. foreign policymakers navigating this new 
environment. How they choose to address this issue will have broader implica-
tions for the 21st century strategic environment, and the ongoing institutional 
debate in Washington will define the tools and resources available to confront 
these new challenges.
Attempts to develop innovative tools are underway. In late 2011 the 4th High 
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness—bringing together ministers of developed 
and developing nations, emerging economies, and providers of South-South and 
triangular cooperative development—met in Busan, South Korea. At the confer-
ence an agreement for effective development cooperation was reached to begin 
addressing some of the shortcomings of the existing development framework, par-
ticularly regarding fragile states. The goals include shifting emphasis from effective 
delivery of assistance to partnerships for sustainable development, more effective 
sharing of information and best practices, and improving regional cooperation.166 
As described in our report, sharing information about climate change and human 
mobility among the countries that constitute the arc of tension would lead to a 
more comprehensive understanding of the current threats. The United States 
could play a constructive role in facilitating such exchanges, but the USAID 
regional mission in West Africa focuses on sub-Saharan countries and neither 
climate change nor migration play a prominent role.167 
The U.S. government’s Global Climate Change Initiative aims to “integrate climate 
change considerations into relevant foreign assistance through the full range of 
bilateral, multilateral, and private mechanisms to foster low-carbon growth, pro-
mote sustainable and resilient societies, and reduce emissions from deforestation 
and land degradation.”168 Integrating climate change into foreign aid and other 
programs to prevent global warming and reduce vulnerability to climate impacts 
in developing countries is a new and important step for the U.S. government, 
which over the past several years has approved development assistance consistent 
with international climate aid goals.
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One method to address these challenges in North-West Africa is through the 
use of USAID “Alert Lists,” which analyze the overlay of fragility and projected 
future climate exposure. Using climate vulnerability estimates developed by David 
Wheeler at the Center for Global Development, the agency then ranks countries by 
vulnerability. The projected outcomes raise concerns; in most highly fragile states 
the danger of instability is exacerbated by environmental degradation (27 out of 33 
countries). This approach is innovative and the country-specific information about 
societal capacities to cope with complex crises can provide the foundation for more 
comprehensive, regional approaches in the future.169 More research is needed in this 
area, especially with regard to the interface of development and security policies.
Some first steps have also been taken in the field of adaptation and mitigation. 
For instance, during the so-called Conference of the Parties in Durban, South 
Africa, in November 2011 under the auspice of the U.N. Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, countries cooperated to create the Green Climate Fund.170 
Contributions to the fund will go toward the goal of mobilizing $100 billion 
annually for adaptation and mitigation in developing countries by 2020, agreed to 
during the international climate change conference in Copenhagen in 2009. 
In the United States money for the Global Climate Change Initiative flows 
through State Department, USAID, and the Treasury Department and is leveraged 
by bilateral and multilateral investments. The administration requested $469.5 
million for the Global Climate Change Initiative in the fiscal year 2013 budget 
request, but the funding faces a potentially hostile reception in the U.S. House of 
Representatives in a tight fiscal environment.171 
From necessary adaptation measures in parts of Niger and Algeria where villages 
are being lost to desertification to mitigation of the cross-border riparian risks in 
the Niger River system, these efforts are crucial to the future of the arc of tension. 
In addition, more funding is vital to deal with rural-urban migration, identified as 
a core issue in a recent analysis by the International Organization of Migration, 
which called for efforts “to strengthen and diversify rural livelihoods, while pre-
paring urban areas for an influx of rural migrants.”172
USAID’s climate change and development strategy focuses on “climate resilient 
low emission sustainable development.”173 USAID strives to directly address many 
of the challenges outlined in this report by integrating climate change throughout 
the agency’s development goals.
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One important step in this direction is USAID’s focus on agriculture and water 
management in Northern Africa, particularly Morocco, with projects to increase 
the capacity of regional public-sector bodies; measures include audits by private 
companies and assistance for agricultural cooperatives to convert to more water-
efficient systems. These are important initiatives in a region where 80 percent of 
total water consumption occurs in the agricultural sector, especially if they can 
be built into broader self-management structures, such as a pilot program to help 
farmers with irrigation-advisory services via cell phone. 
At the regional level a long discussed project to battle desertification in the 
southern Sahara, the “Great Green Wall” initiative, is finally underway, promoting 
development and more sophisticated resource management under the umbrella 
of the Community of the Sahel-Saharan States and the African Union. The goal is 
not only to establish sustainable agricultural and pastoralist livelihoods, but also to 
allay rural poverty and the resulting urbanization.174 
The African Union is one of the few entities to have established a comprehen-
sive migration-policy framework.175 Unfortunately, most of these initiatives still 
exist in isolation from each other and focus on only one aspect of complex crisis 
scenarios—we argue that connections need to be made between policymakers 
and practitioners who deal with environmental change, internal and transnational 
migration, and security. The United States and major Western providers of foreign 
assistance must develop research capabilities and innovative policy conversations 
along these interdisciplinary lines.
To better achieve results, USAID recently launched USAID FORWARD, a reform 
agenda that focuses resources on projects that are demonstrating results, improves 
the monitoring and analysis of sustainable development projects, and creates a 
Bureau of Policy, Planning and Learning to gather and share information on new 
development approaches.176 By the end of 2013, almost every USAID mission 
around the world aims to have a so-called Country Development Cooperation 
Strategy in place working with host countries and other U.S. agencies to ensure 
programs address local requirements.177 Again, these strategies should be placed in 
a regional context to address climate change, migration, and insecurity, as interna-
tional borders are not defining in the Sahel-Saharan region.
These new programs still need to be fully implemented, but if properly executed 
they could be a useful indicator of how the United States will engage in these new 
fields of action in years to come. We support the recommendations formulated 
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by the International Organization for Migration calling for the establishment of 
a virtual clearing house documenting all relevant information on environmental 
migration, conversations to define comprehensive migration management poli-
cies, consultations with affected communities, interdepartmental coordination 
within governments, and “inter-State partnerships and dialogue on environmental 
migration, especially at the regional level.”178 These strategies need to be coordi-
nated with and integrated into the U.S. climate strategy and coordinated with the 
strategic regional reviews undertaken at the Pentagon.
Better deployment of existing foreign-assistance resources
Although global climate change is a crucial issue for USAID, the allocation of 
funding, especially across Northwest Africa, still focuses on agriculture and 
water. It is time to move on. Isolated agricultural and water projects in coun-
tries such as Morocco, for example, where 85 percent of agriculture is rain-fed 
and massive subsidies support wheat and energy imports, will not provide 
sustainable answers. USAID’s upcoming five-year strategy needs to focus more 
on integrated responses to complex crisis scenarios and less on establishing 
bureaucratic workflows. Currently, the reporting procedures and conditions for 
U.S. foreign aid are so cumbersome that some recipient governments opt out 
of available funding or look to other countries or private foundations with less 
burdensome restrictions for assistance. 
But ways to enhance the efficiency do exist. The Busan Partnership, mentioned 
above, seeks to limit reporting requirements and the international assistance com-
munity would do well to eliminate reporting requirements that only serve particu-
lar industries or interest groups. For food aid programs, supporting local-purchase 
programs and ending cargo preference programs are good first steps, and USAID 
should be applauded for committing to purchase local goods wherever possible 
under the FORWARD program.179 
Other improvements could include the permanent elimination of earmarks for 
all U.S. foreign assistance programs. In general, ensuring a coherent approach 
across all of the U.S. development assistance by implementing Presidential Policy 
Directive 6—outlining a process to rebalance defense and development—is vital. 
The Policy Directive states in clear terms the need to “elevate development as a 
central pillar of our national security policy, equal to diplomacy and defense, and 
build and integrate the capabilities that can advance our interests.”180
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Foreign assistance has to add value and be coordinated and we need to better 
identify the core strengths of different donors in specific national or regional con-
texts. For instance, if China is investing in infrastructure, the European Union is 
offering assistance to legal institutions and agriculture, and private foundations are 
building a health sector, then the United States can add significant value in helping 
to build vibrant small- and medium-size enterprises, improving higher education, 
or providing technological support. 
So far, the United States has not effectively combined forces with existing partners 
to coordinate projects and policies to maximize results and achieve strategic goals. 
The Millennium Challenge Cooperation—which delivers U.S. foreign assistance 
focusing on competitive selection and country-led implementation—has taken 
steps in this direction by partnering with host governments and the private sector. 
The United States and the international community should keep a focus on 
police reform, a crucial aspect of democratic reform. For instance, effective law 
enforcement is an important response to northern Nigeria’s problems with Boko 
Haram, or the growing operational capacities of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
in Algeria and Morocco. Effective and fair police forces bolster security and help 
institutionalize human rights. So far, the U.S. track record in this field has been 
mixed. In Nigeria, for example, efforts have been underway for over a decade with 
indifferent results. It is important that U.S. assistance for such programs is not 
misappropriated in the host country and achieves its intended outcome. 
A new, more comprehensive approach is the best way forward. As the World Bank’s 
2011 “Conflict, Security, and Development” report notes, 1.5 billion people live in 
fragile or conflict-affected areas and no country exposed to insecurity has achieved 
a single U.N. Millennium Development Goal. Climate change and competition for 
natural resources add “new external pressures […] that could heighten” risks of 
violence. Thus, the report places analysis of the impacts of climate change on areas at 
risk of violence as a priority for future research and policy work. Only this difficult 
process can establish more effective governance in fragile states, strengthening legiti-
mate institutions and governance to provide security and the rule of law to break 
cycles of violence. Based on the World Bank’s 2011 report, we recommend a broad 
strategy that includes the rule of law and citizen security.181 
As mentioned, police reform is an important part of this effort but needs to be 
combined with judicial reform and increased overall transparency of government. 
The United States needs to overhaul its internal mechanisms for assisting in police 
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reform, as programs are often poorly coordinated between the different agencies, 
contracted out to private companies, or piecemeal. In addition, these efforts in 
Northwest Africa are not usually part of a broader security sector-reform strategy 
as they are in Afghanistan, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Iraq. 
Domestic civilian-law enforcement needs to be strengthened as national militaries 
are not suited to practice civilian-law enforcement. 
Flexibility is key to enable foreign-assistance programs to anticipate future problems 
associated with climate change, migration, and security. USAID has begun to build 
consensus on emerging threats and priorities with partner governments and needs 
the ability to react to new challenges or changes in partner status or priorities.
The Obama administration consults with other countries on emerging crisis situ-
ations, but those consultations are frequently divorced from the funding stream. 
This practice needs to be deepened through consultation, scenario planning, and 
extended dialogues with Congress. While foreign assistance often requires long-
term commitments to be effective, we must retain the ability to redeploy funds or 
make discretionary funds available to respond to new developments. 
Nongovernmental institutional solutions are also important. A number of scholars 
and experts are calling for migration-management institutes to bring together 
experts to generate policy ideas for complex crisis scenarios. They also emphasize 
the need for nongovernmental organizations to change and integrate their strate-
gies regarding humanitarian aid and development assistance to take into account 
climate change threats and associated migration issues. We support the recom-
mendation to move from immediate crisis response toward long-term and com-
prehensive strategies of rebuilding, resettlement, and development. Cooperation 
between all stakeholders is crucial for effective policy making and climate change 
needs to be placed at the center of conversations about migration-related crises. 
A few scholars have also called for a special or legal definition of internally displaced 
persons as refugees, despite the fact that they have not crossed international bor-
ders, arguing that they migrate for the same reasons as refugees just simply do not 
leave their country. Changing the classification could help draw more international 
attention to the problems of environmental migrants, which in turn could result in 
increased and improved policy making.182 Those suggestions are worth consideration. 
In addition, the so-called Climate Change Displacement and Resettlement model 
combines existing models on development-induced displacement and resettle-
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ment- and disaster-induced displacement to address the complex nature of climate 
change displacement, specifically targeting the needs of internally displaced 
persons. The model provides baselines for strategies dealing with sudden-impact 
and slow-onset climate phenomena. It was proposed as a general framework from 
which to begin defining a disaster model that more directly addresses the needs of 
climate migrants. The model is still very much “a starting point for the incorpora-
tion of current literature and strategies,” according to a leading expert on climate 
change-induced migration, Andrea C.S. Berringer, and more research is needed 
for policymakers to understand climate migrants.183 
U.S. foreign-assistance policy has the capability to incorporate these new ideas in 
order to address complex crisis scenarios in new regional contexts. Currently, the 
funding for USAID “country teams” comes primarily from the country missions, but 
it is difficult for mission staffs (and local partners) to understand the complex drivers 
behind the nexus of climate change, migration, and conflicts. It is important that we 
increase awareness at the strategic and tactical levels across the U.S. government.
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